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Closing the Loopholes in Domestic Violence
Laws: The Constitutionality of 18
U.S.C. §922(g)(9)
I. Introduction
On July 9, 1992, Barbara O'Dell arrived home to a very
unpleasant surprise. Her husband, from whom she was legally
separated and against whom she had a restraining order, was
in her garage - waiting for her. "I've left the other woman and
want to return home," he said.' Apparently, however, she had
had enough. She did not want him back and asked him repeat-
edly to leave.2 Rodolfo O'Dell's wife's response to his plea made
him angry, then violent. He grabbed her by the neck and began
to choke her.3 She could feel her bones cracking, she could not
breathe, and she could hear herself gurgling.4 She was terri-
fied, but her husband's attack did not end there. He raped her
four times, biting her as he attacked her.5
Rodolfo O'Dell was first charged with four counts of felony
rape, 6 but the case resulted in a mistrial. Rodolfo subsequently
pled no contest to a one count charge of spousal battery, a mis-
demeanor. Rodolfo was a police officer at the time of the horrific
ordeal. Now he is a detective.7
1. Hector Tobar, Officer's Expunged Conviction Angers Ex-Wife, Los ANGELES
TIMES, May 26, 1997, at B-1.
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. Id.
6. See Tobar, supra note 1, at B-1.
7. See id.
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The Lautenberg Amendment8 is the first step towards stop-
ping the type of horrific ordeal endured by Barbara O'Dell and
preventing the subsequent "slap in the face" from the criminal
justice system which allowed Rodolfo to plead to a misde-
meanor. Pursuant to this law, officers, such as Rodolfo O'Dell,
will no longer be law enforcement officers because the law takes
from any person convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence the privilege of possessing a firearm - even law en-
forcement officers.
II. Background
A. Legislative History
On March 21, 1996, Senator Frank Lautenberg (D-N.J.), in-
troduced S-1632, a bill aimed at curbing domestic violence by
taking firearms and ammunition out of the hands of anyone
convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. The
proposed bill was slightly altered and then, on July 25, 1996,
incorporated into the proposed anti-stalking legislation by voice
vote. 9 Because the House of Representatives did not act on the
anti-stalking bill, Senator Lautenberg offered his bill as an
amendment to the Treasury, Postal Service, and General Gov-
ernment Appropriations Bill of 1997. Lautenberg offered his
amendment as part of the Omnibus Consolidated Appropria-
tions Act of 1997 because the Treasury and Postal bill was pul-
led from the floor. 1°  The Lautenberg Amendment was
overwhelmingly approved by the Senate on September 12, 1996,
by a vote of 97-2.1" Nevertheless, the bill was characterized as
controversial because of its content, because it was never de-
8. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (1998).
9. See 142 CONG. REC. S11,872-01 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Lautenberg); Frank Lautenberg, Lautenberg Offers Amendment to Treasury, Pos-
tal Service Appropriations Bill That Takes Guns Out of the Hands of Wife Beaters
and Child Abusers, GOVT PRESS RELEASES, Sept. 12, 1996, available in 1996 WL
11124929.
10. See 142 CONG. REC. S11,872-01 (Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Lautenberg).
11. See id.; see also Frank Lautenberg, Lautenberg Offers to Treasury, Postal
Service Appropriations Bill that Takes Guns Out of the Hands of Wife Beaters and
Child Abusers, Sept. 12, 1996, available in 1996 WL 11124929.
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bated on the House floor, 12 and because it was just a very small
portion of a huge spending bill that was finalized in the early
morning hours of September 28, 1996.13
On September 30, 1996, the Lautenberg Amendment be-
came law. The Amendment states that:
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person... who has been convicted in
any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, 14 to ship
or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or
affecting interstate commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to
receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or
transported in interstate or foreign commerce. 15
Before September 30, 1996, law enforcement officers were ex-
empt from any disabilities provided for in the Gun Control Act
of 1968.16 Another amendment, however, declared law enforce-
ment would not be exempt from the new law:
The provisions of this chapter, except for sections 922(d)(9) and
922(g)(9) and provisions relating to firearms subject to the prohibi-
tions of section 922(p), shall not apply with respect to the trans-
portation, shipment, receipt, possession, or importation of any
firearm or ammunition imported for, sold or shipped to, or issued
for the use of, the United States or any department or agency
12. See Rep. Helen Chenoweth, Domestic Violence is a Serious Issue, But
Amendment is not the Solution, IDAHO STATESMAN, Aug. 11, 1997, at 6a.
13. See 142 CONG. REC. S11872-01 (Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Lautenberg).
14. 18 U.S.C. § 921(33)(A) (1998) defines a misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence as any offense that "is a misdemeanor under federal or state law" and
has, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force, or the
threatened use of a deadly weapon, committed by a current or former
spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim, by a person with whom the victim
shares a child in common, by a person who is cohabiting with or has cohab-
ited with the victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian, or by a person simi-
larly situated to a spouse, parent or guardian of the victim.
Thus, the offense charged need not include domestic violence as part of the offense,
but need only have, in the underlying facts, an element of domestic violence. For
example, a basic assault as defined by federal and individual state jurisdictions,
does not include, as an element, that it be perpetrated upon one of the categories
of victims described by 18 U.S.C. § 921(33)(A) above. If, however, an assault is
perpetrated upon such a victim, the offense is within the realm of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(9).
15. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).
16. Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (1968).
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thereof or any State or any department, agency, or political subdi-
vision thereof.17
The Lautenberg Amendment has touched, and indeed
amended, other laws. It has been associated with the recently
enacted Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA)' 8 because
of its stated purpose of combating domestic violence.19 Addition-
ally, the law has amended both the Gun Control Act of 1968 and
the Brady Handgun Law. 20
17. 18 U.S.C. § 925(a)(1) (emphasis added).
18. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.). The Lautenberg Amendment is one of five federal domestic violence stat-
utes. The statutes passed under VAWA include: 18 U.S.C. § 2261 (Interstate Do-
mestic Violence); 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (Interstate Stalking); and 18 U.S.C. § 2262
(Interstate Violation of a Protective Order). The other two statutes were passed as
amendments to the Gun Control Act of 1968 and include the statute at issue
herein, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(9) and (g)(8), which prohibits anyone subject to a court
order that "restrains such person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an inti-
mate partner . . . or person, or engaging in other conduct that would place an
intimate partner in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the partner or child" and
includes a finding that the person represents a threat to the physical safety of the
partner or child, or prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
force against the partner or child, from shipping, transporting or possessing any
firearm or ammunition. Two corollary amendments to §§ 922(g)(8) and (g)(9) are
§§ 922(d)(8) and (d)(9), which prohibit anyone from selling or otherwise disposing
of a firearm or ammunition to anyone subject to a protection order or to anyone
who has been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.
19. "I believe that [the Lautenberg Amendment] will save the lives of many
battered wives and abused children. And it will send a message that, as a nation,
we are determined to take the problem of domestic violence seriously." 142 CONG.
REC. S11,872-01 (Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
20. The Brady Handgun Law requires background checks and waiting periods
for people seeking to purchase a firearm. The Lautenberg Amendment amended
the Brady Law to require that chief law enforcement officers ("CLEOs") in "Brady
states" "shall make a reasonable effort to ascertain within 5 business days"
whether a prospective buyer's receipt of a handgun would be in violation of the
law. 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2); see also Open Letter to All State and Local Law En-
forcement Officials, Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms 3 (Nov. 26, 1996) (on file with the U.S. Dept. of Justice Office of Public
Affairs). The reasonable effort standard is to be determined by each law enforce-
ment agency based upon their individual circumstances such as "availability of
resources, access to records, and the law enforcement priorities of the jurisdiction."
Id. at 3; see also Gun Ban for Domestic Violence Offenders Means Cities Must Take
New Steps, NATION'S CITIES WEEKLY, Jan. 13, 1997. The United States Supreme
Court held § 922(s)(2) unconstitutional in Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365
(1997), however, because "'[tlhe Federal Government may not compel the States to
enact or administer a federal regulatory program.' [(Citations omitted)]. The
mandatory obligation imposed on CLEOs to perform background checks on pro-
spective handgun purchasers plainly runs afoul of that rule." Id. at 2383.
448
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B. Law Enforcement Reacts
On the federal level, the Department of Justice ("DOJ")21
reacted to the passage of the new statute by first establishing a
working group led by the Office of Investigative Agency Policies
("OIAP") and consisting of representatives of the FBI, EOUSA,
BOP, OIG, USMS, DEA, INS, the Justice Management Divi-
sion, the Criminal Division, the Office of Intergovernmental Af-
fairs, and the Office of Policy Development. 22 The purpose of
the group was to determine the implications of the new law.
The first project of the OIAP working group was to determine
the best way to identify law enforcement agents who had been
convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence and en-
able affected agencies to both "retrieve any agency-issued fire-
arms and ammunition" and "rescind any agency-issued
authority to carry privately owned firearms and ammunition as
part of an agent's official duties."23
A letter was issued by the Deputy Attorney General on De-
cember 5, 1996, to the directors of affected DOJ agencies. The
agencies, upon recommendation of the OIAP working group,
were given forty-five days to certify that they had identified af-
fected agents in their ranks and were told to report to the Dep-
uty Attorney General the management steps that were taken,
such as termination or reassignment of the agents so affected.
Each agency was instructed to issue a memorandum that ex-
plained the new law to all employees authorized to carry gov-
ernment issued firearms and ammunition. 24 Attached to the
21. Federal agencies within the Department of Justice that have employees
affected by the new law include the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), the
Executive Office of United States Attorneys ("EOUSA"), the Bureau of Prisons
("BOP"), the Office of the Inspector General ("OIG"), the United States Marshals
Service ("USMS"), the Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA"), and the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service ("INS").
22. See Memorandum From the Deputy Attorney General, Office of the Dep-
uty Attorney General 2 (Dec. 5, 1996) (on file with the U.S. Dept. of Justice, Office
of Public Affairs).
23. Id.
24. See id. A sample of the memorandum to be issued to "All Employees Au-
thorized to Possess Government-Issued Firearms and Ammunition" was attached
to the Deputy Attorney General's letter and read as follows:
There has been a recent change in the law pertaining to possession of fire-
arms or ammunition. On September 30, 1996, Title 18, United States Code,
Section 922(g)(9) took effect, making it illegal for anyone who has been con-
1999] 449
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memorandum was a qualification inquiry that each employee
was to complete and return to an immediate supervisor.25 The
qualification inquiry was to serve as the employee's certification
that he or she either has or has not been convicted of a misde-
meanor crime of domestic violence. 26 Compliance by federal
victed of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence to possess any firearm or
ammunition. "Misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" is generally defined
as any offense - - whether or not explicitly described in a statute as a crime
of domestic violence - - which has, as its factual basis, the use or attempted
use of physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon, committed
by the victim's current or former domestic partner, parent, or guardian. The
term "convicted" is generally defined in the statute as excluding anyone
whose conviction has been expunged, or been set aside, or has received a
pardon ....
This provision applies to persons convicted at any time prior to or after the
passage of the September 30, 1996 law. Moreover, there is no exemption for
law enforcement officers and agents. If you have ever been convicted of a
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence within the meaning of the statute,
continued retention of any firearm or ammunition, whether Government-
issued or privately owned, may subject you to felony criminal penalties, in-
cluding a sentence of imprisonment of up to ten years and a fine of up to
$250,000, as well as administrative action.
If you are affected by this statute: (1) you may not possess any firearm or
ammunition; and (2) you must return any Government-issued firearm or
ammunition to [your immediate supervisor]. Furthermore, since the statute
makes it illegal for you to possess any firearm or ammunition, any previ-
ously issued authorization to possess a firearm or ammunition is revoked.
Attached to this memorandum is a qualification inquiry, which you must
complete and return to [your immediate supervisor,] within ten (10) work-
ing days of receipt. If you have any questions, you may contact [your imme-
diate supervisor, agency ethics officer, union representative], or private
attorney.
Id. at attachment, sample letter.
25. Id. at attachment, sample qualification inquiry.
26. The qualification inquiry form was a one-page document that agents were
required to complete within ten working days. See Memorandum from the Deputy
Attorney General, Office of the Deputy Attorney General, at attachment, sample
qualification inquiry (Dec. 5, 1996) (on file with the U.S. Dept. of Justice, Office of
Public Affairs). The form informed the agents as follows:
(a) The purpose [of this form] is to obtain information which will assist in
the determination of whether personnel reassignment and/or administrative
action are warranted.
(b) You have a duty to complete this form. Agency disciplinary action, in-
cluding dismissal, may be undertaken if you refuse to answer or if you fail to
reply fully and truthfully.
(c) Neither your answers nor any information or evidence gained by reason
of your answers can be used against you in any criminal prosecution for a
violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 922(g)(9). However, the
answers you furnish and any information or evidence resulting therefrom
450
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agents authorized to carry government issued firearms was
mandatory and virtually 100% of the agents from each affected
agency cooperated. 27
In addition to self regulation, the DOJ, through the Direc-
tor of the Office of Intergovernmental Affairs, issued a letter to
all State Attorneys General on December 6, 1996.28 The letter
explained the new law, its implications on law enforcement of-
ficers, explained the role of the OIAP working group and ex-
plained the procedures implemented in the DOJ.29 In addition,
the letter added:
These procedures and the forms associated with them are not
binding on other law enforcement agencies. How other agencies
may be used against you in a prosecution for knowingly and willfully provid-
ing false statements or information, and in the course of agency disciplinary
proceedings.
Id. at attachment 2. Agents then had to respond by checking either "yes" or "no" to
the question of whether or not they had ever been convicted of a misdemeanor
crime of domestic violence. If the answer was yes, information had to be provided
concerning the jurisdiction in which the conviction occurred, the docket or case
number, the statute under which the agent was charged, and the date of the sen-
tencing. See id. At the bottom of the inquiry was a certification that read as
follows:
I hereby certify that, to the best of my information and belief, all of the infor-
mation provided by me is true, correct, complete, and made in good faith. I
understand that false or fraudulent information provided herein may be
grounds for adverse action, up to and including removal, and is also crimi-
nally punishable pursuant to federal law, including 18 U.S.C. § 1001.
Id. Agents then had to sign and date the form and return it to their immediate
supervisors. See id.
27. Pursuant to a table issued by the United States Department of Justice,
Office of Public Affairs, the following statistics represent agencies' compliance
with the Qualification Inquiry and the number of agents affected by the disability
to date:
Employees % of Employees Number of Employees Number of Employees
Agency Surveyed Contacted Disqualified
FBI 99.90 10,870 0
EOUSA 100.00 81 0
BOP 99.90 28,485 64
OIG 100.00 127 0
USMS 100.00 7,029 0
DEA 100.00 3,752 0
INS 99.20 14,470 19
28. Memorandum for All State Attorneys General, Office of Intergovernmen-
tal Affairs, United States Department of Justice, at attachment, table (Dec. 6,
1996) (on file with the U.S. Dept. of Justice, Office of Public Affairs).
29. See id.
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comply with this new law is a matter within their discretion.
However, these procedures and the forms associated with them
are the product of a great deal of considered and deliberate work
and legal analysis. Law enforcement therefore may find these
procedures and forms useful.30
Finally, the letter noted that chief law enforcement officers
("CLEOs") of state, county, and local law enforcement agencies
would be asked to certify, using forms similar to those described
above, that any officers deputized by any DOJ law enforcement
agency are still eligible, pursuant to the new law, to carry a fire-
arm and ammunition.31
Statutorily, federal agencies are not required to seek out
agents or deputized officers who are adversely affected by this
new law. The only time agencies must act, according to the
statute, is when they become aware of an agent or officer who
has been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic vio-
lence, because those persons affected are in violation of the law
when possessing a firearm or ammunition. According to the
statute, agencies have no obligation to implement any proce-
dures to find any affected law enforcement officers. Even so,
however, all federal and many state agencies continue to act
prospectively.
The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms ("ATF"), an
agency within the United States Department of the Treasury,
has jurisdiction over and is responsible for enforcement of gun
control laws. 32 In response to the passage of the Lautenberg
Amendment, the director of the ATF, John W. Magaw, issued
an "Open Letter To All State And Local Law Enforcement Offi-
cials" on November 26, 1996. 33 The purpose of the letter was to
30. Id. at 1.
31. See id. at 2.
32. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms home page, Mission Statement
(last modified October 24, 1997) <http://www.atf.treas.gov/aboutlmission.htm>.
33. Attached to the letter was a document titled "Questions And Answers Re-
garding Misdemeanor Crime Of Domestic Violence" to assist officers in under-
standing how the new law was to be applied. The document was written in a
question and answer format:
Q. X was convicted of misdemeanor assault on October 10, 1996. The
crime of assault does not make specific mention of domestic violence but the
criminal complaint reflects that he assaulted his wife. May X still possess
firearms or ammunition?
A. No. X may no longer possess firearms or ammunition.
452 [Vol. 19:445
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notify law enforcement officials of the passage of the
Lautenberg Amendment and specified that there is no exemp-
tion in this law for law enforcement officers. The letter further
notes that the law applies to people convicted of misdemeanor
Q. X was convicted of the same crime on September 20, 1996, 10 days
before the effective date of the new statute. He possesses a firearm on Octo-
ber 10, 1996. May X lawfully possess firearms?
A. No. If a person was convicted of the crime at any time, he or she may
not lawfully possess firearms or ammunition on or after September 30, 1996.
Q. Officer C was charged with felony assault on her child in 1989. She
pled guilty to a misdemeanor and the felony charge was dismissed. She was
suspended from the police force and ordered to undergo counseling. After
successful completion of the counseling, she was reinstated. May Officer C
lawfully possess firearms or ammunition?
A. No. Officer C may no longer lawfully possess firearms or ammunition
either on or off duty.
Note: For one who has been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence, the prohibition on the possession of firearms and ammunition does
not apply if the individual has received a pardon for the crime, the convic-
tion has been expunged or set-aside, or the person has had civil rights re-
stored (if there was a loss of civil rights) AND the person is not otherwise
prohibited from possessing firearms or ammunition.
Open Letter to All State and Local Law Enforcement Officials, Department of the
Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, at attachment, Questions and
Answers Regarding Misdemeanor Crime of Domestic Violence (undated) (on file
with the U.S. Dept. of Justice, Office of Public Affairs).
In addition to the letter issued to all state and local law enforcement officials,
ATF Director John Magaw issued similar letters to the public and to all federal
firearms licensees informing them of the new law. The letter to the public noted
that if anyone had ever been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic vio-
lence, they should "immediately lawfully dispose of their firearms and ammuni-
tion." Open Letter From the Director, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms,
Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms 2 (undated)
(on file with the U.S. Dept. of Justice, Office of Public Affairs). The letter to federal
firearms licensees explained the amendments to the Gun Control Act, specifically
18 U.S.C. § 923(j), concerning the sale of curio or relic firearms, and § 922(g)(9),
concerning persons convicted of misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence. The let-
ter defined the misdemeanor crime of domestic violence and explained the retroac-
tivity of the statute, as well as the prohibitions made by the statute. Of greatest
concern to the federal licensees is the prohibition of knowingly selling a firearm to
a person convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. Thus, the ATF
informed the licensees that applicable forms were being amended to reflect the
new provisions and would be distributed as soon as possible. In the meantime,
however, the ATF stated that licensees should inquire of customers "whether they
have been convicted of a disqualifying domestic violence misdemeanor and avoid
any firearm or ammunition transfers to such persons." Open Letter to All Federal
Firearms Licensees, Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms 3 (undated) (on file with the U.S. Dept. of Justice, Office of Public
Affairs).
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crimes of domestic violence, even if the conviction occurred
before the effective date of the law, unless the conviction "has
been expunged, set aside, pardoned, or the person has had his
or her civil rights restored (if the law of the applicable jurisdic-
tion provides for the loss of civil rights under such an offense)
AND the person is not otherwise prohibited from possessing
firearms or ammunition."34 Director Magaw made clear to the
officials that this disability applied to firearms and ammunition
issued by governmental agencies, purchased for use in perform-
ing official duties, and possessed for personal use.35
Pursuant to the Tenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution,36 state and local law enforcement agencies are
not, and indeed cannot be required to proactively seek out law
enforcement officers in their ranks with misdemeanor convic-
tions of domestic violence and disarm them 7 This is reflected
not only in the amendment to the Gun Control Act and other
firearms statutes, 38 where the law is silent as to any agency's
obligation to find such persons, but also in Director Magaw's
letter, where he writes "your department may want to deter-
mine if any employee who is authorized to carry a firearm is
subject to this disability and what appropriate action should be
taken."39 Even if the agency becomes aware of one of its em-
ployees being subject to the "disability," the language of the let-
ter merely states that "we recommend that such persons be
encouraged to relinquish all firearms and ammunition in their
possession."40 The language only becomes commanding, how-
ever, when speaking to the obligation of the individual subject
34. Open Letter to All State and Local Law Enforcement Officials, Depart-
ment of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms 2 (Nov. 26, 1996)
(on file with the U.S. Dept. of Justice, Office of Public Affairs) (emphasis in origi-
nal); see also 18 U.S.C. § 921(33)(B)(ii) (1998).
35. See Open Letter to All State and Local Law Enforcement Officials, Depart-
ment of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms 2 (Nov. 26, 1996)
(on file with the U.S. Dept. of Justice, Office of Public Affairs).
36. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
37. See infra Part III(B).
38. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 925; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-944.
39. Open Letter to All State and Local Law Enforcement Officials, Depart-
ment of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms 2 (undated) (on file
with the U.S. Dept. of Justice, Office of Public Affairs) (emphasis added).
40. Id. (emphasis added).
454 [Vol. 19:445
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to the disability: "Employees subject to this disability must im-
mediately dispose of all firearms and ammunition in their pos-
session" or face the possibility of criminal penalties. 41
Because the law does not require law enforcement agencies
to act prospectively, state agencies' reactions have varied.
Some police departments, such as the New York City Police De-
partment,42 have reacted by implementing a procedure similar
to that implemented by the U.S. Department of Justice. In
Denver, one patrol officer and one detective have been reas-
signed to desk jobs as a result of the Lautenberg Amendment's
passage.43 In Los Angeles, three sheriffs deputies have been
disarmed, 44 and it was expected that of the 8,300 active duty
deputies and 9,400 police officers, some forty deputies and
thirty to forty officers would be affected by the new law.45 Other
agencies, however, are more skeptical of the law and believe
that it is unconstitutional. 46 Thus, they have refused to imple-
ment any policies until they "see what happens in court."47
In proactively implementing procedures to seek out officers
in their ranks with misdemeanor convictions of domestic vio-
lence, the New York City Police Department issued Operations
Order Number 39 on April 21, 1997, to "All Commands" and
informed them of the Lautenberg Amendment. The Order di-
rected commanding officers "[t]o identify members of the ser-
vice affected by this legislation . . . by ensur[ing] that all
uniformed members, regardless of their duty status, and civil-
ian members under their command, when their duties require
possession of a firearm and/or ammunition, complete the DO-
41. Id. (emphasis added).
42. See New York City Department, Operations Order Number 39, at 1 (Apr.
21, 1997) (on file with the New York City Police Dept., Office of Public
Information).
43. See Jillian Lloyd, Police Up In Arms Over Revised Federal Gun Law,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 18, 1996, at 4.
44. See Kenneth Reich, Dozens of Officers Could Lose Weapons Under New
Domestic Violence Law, Los ANGELES TIMES, Dec. 28, 1996, at B-1.
45. See id.
46. Lloyd, supra note 43, at 4.
47. See id.
1999] 455
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MESTIC VIOLENCE INQUIRY ."48 Members of the
Department
who disclose or who are found to have a qualifying conviction for
which they have not been pardoned, the conviction has not been
expunged, or their civil rights have not been restored, shall be
placed on modified assignment by their commanding officer, by
authority of the First Deputy Commissioner, pursuant to Patrol
Guide procedures 118-10,49 "Cause For Suspension or Modified
Assignment," and 118-12,50 "Modified Assignment," shall have
their firearms removed pursuant to Patrol Guide procedure 120-
09,51 "Removal and Restoration of Firearms," and, shall be re-
ferred to the Early Intervention Unit.52
Additionally, applicants to the Department are now screened to
determine whether or not they have committed a misdemeanor
crime of domestic violence: "[Applicants, whether for] uni-
formed or civilian [positions], whose duties would require they
possess a firearm, rifle or shotgun will complete DOMESTIC VI-
48. New York City Police Department, Operations Order Number 39, at 1
(Apr. 21, 1997) (on file with the New York City Police Dept., Office of Public
Information).
49. New York City Police Department Patrol Guide Procedure 118-10 de-
scribes who has the authority to suspend or place on modified assignment a uni-
formed or civilian member of the police department. Further, 118-10 explains
under what conditions uniformed or civilian members of the police department
may and must be suspended and under what conditions a uniformed member may
be placed on modified assignment. See New York City Police Department Patrol
Guide Procedure 118-10, "Cause for Suspension or Modified Assignment" (on file
with the New York City Police Dept., Office of Public Information).
50. New York City Police Department Patrol Guide Procedure 118-12 de-
scribes the procedure for placing a uniformed member of the department on modi-
fied assignment. It includes removing from the officer, apparently in all situations
of modified assignment, his firearm, shield, identification card, and any other de-
partment property. On the next business day, the officer must go to the Personnel
Orders Section where he apparently receives his new assignment. See New York
City Police Department Patrol Guide Procedure 118-12, "Modified Assignment" (on
file with the New York City Police Dept., Office of Public Information).
51. New York City Police Department Patrol Guide Procedure 120-09 ex-
plains the procedure by which the department removes all firearms from a uni-
formed officer. See New York City Police Department Patrol Guide Procedure 120-
09, "Removal and Restoration of Firearms" (on file with the New York City Police
Dept., Office of Public Information).
52. New York City Police Department, Operations Order Number 39, at 1
(Apr. 21, 1997) (on file with the New York City Police Dept., Office of Public
Information).
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OLENCE INQUIRY - APPLICANT ... as part of the applica-
tion process."53
The New York City Police Department's Office of Public In-
formation was unable to disclose the number of officers affected
by the enactment of the Lautenberg Amendment to date.
Similarly, in Los Angeles, the Los Angeles Police Depart-
ment has acted proactively in seeking out affected officers.
There, Special Order Number 7 was released by the Office of the
Chief of Police on July 28, 1997.5 Initially, the order sets forth
the background of the Lautenberg Amendment, when it was en-
acted, what it stands for and how it effects officers. 55 Addition-
ally, it explains that domestic violence need not be the actual
crime charged for a qualifying offense; it need only be an ele-
ment of the crime with which an affected person was charged. 56
The stated purpose of Special Order 7 is to establish a uniform
procedure to identify "employees prohibited from possessing,
shipping, transporting, or receiving a firearm and/or ammuni-
tion under the federal law."57 The remainder of the Order ex-
plains the procedure to be followed by an affected officer, his
commanding officer and an internal affairs commanding
officer. 58
Once law enforcement personnel review Special Order 7,
they are required to complete the "Acknowledgement of Re-
ceipt" form on the last page of the Order which, unlike the more
detailed federal and New York City Police Department forms,
asks only whether the officer reviewing the Order has ever been
convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence as de-
fined by 18 U.S.C. § 921(33)(A)59 and is then directed to check
"yes," "no," or "I am not sure" and then sign the form as an ac-
knowledgment of receipt of the Order and affirmation that he
answered the question truthfully.60
53. Id.
54. Los Angeles Police Dept., Special Order No. 7 (July 28, 1997) (on file with
the Los Angeles Police Dept.).
55. See id. at 1-2.
56. See id. at 1.
57. Id. at 2.
58. See id. at 2-7.
59. See supra note 14.
60. See Los Angeles Police Department, Special Order No. 7, at 9 (July 28,
1997) (on file with the Los Angeles Police Dept.).
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If an officer answers affirmatively, pursuant to the Order, it
is then his responsibility to notify his commanding officer and
submit a report that includes a brief summary of the facts of the
case, the approximate date of the filing of the criminal com-
plaint, the booking charge, the arresting agency, the approxi-
mate date of conviction, the docket number, the nature of the
charges, the disposition of the case and whether the incident
was investigated by the Los Angeles Police Department. 61 Once
the commanding officer becomes aware of such a conviction, he
is responsible for retrieving from the employee all city-owned
firearms and ammunition in the employee's possession in a dis-
crete manner so as not to embarrass the officer, completing an
equipment/firearms receipt, reassigning the officer to a position
that does not require possession of a firearm, and notifying the
Internal Affairs Division of the situation.
At the time of the retrieval, the commanding officer must
advise the officer that the retrieved city-owned firearms and de-
partment-issued ammunition will be held by the commanding
officer, that privately owned firearms should immediately be
turned over to a third party, and that written confirmation of
such action should be given to the commanding officer within
seventy-two hours after receiving the advisement. 62 Further,
the commanding officer is responsible for notifying the officer
that a preliminary inquiry will be performed within ninety days
of the date of that officer notified his commanding officer of the
situation.6 3 Once the preliminary inquiry is performed, the
commanding officer is then responsible for determining whether
or not a personnel complaint investigation should be initiated.64
Finally, the commanding officer must complete the "Employee
Notification - Prohibition from Possessing, Shipping, Transport-
ing or Receiving a Firearm and/or Ammunition"65 form and
61. See id. at 4-5.
62. See id. at 5.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See Los Angeles Police Dept., Special Order No. 7 at 5. The form, as its
name states, notifies an officer that he is prohibited from possessing, shipping,
transporting, or receiving a firearm and/or ammunition pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(9). The form directs the officer to surrender city-owned weapons and am-
munition and to refrain from possessing, shipping, transporting or receiving them
until further notice and directs him to surrender privately owned weapons to a
third party. Additionally, if confronted with a situation where police action is re-
458 [Vol. 19:445
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presenting the same to the affected officer for his signature. 66
At this point, the officer is effectively disarmed and reassigned
to a position that does not require a firearm unless and until the
conviction is expunged or set aside. If the conviction is not ex-
punged or set aside, or if there is no determination regarding a
possible violation of § 922(g)(9) within ninety days of the officer
being notified, an administrative investigation will be initiated
by the commanding officer's forwarding a Personnel Complaint
form to the commanding officer of the Internal Affairs Divi-
sion.67 The Legal Division of the Los Angeles Police Depart-
ment was unable to reveal the number of officers affected by the
enactment of the Lautenberg Amendment to date.
C. Resulting Case Law
Since the enactment of the Lautenberg Amendment on
September 30, 1996, a growing number of cases have been pub-
lished that challenge its constitutionality. 68 The first case,
quired while either on or off duty, the officer is advised to consider alternatives to
affecting an arrest himself without a weapon, where the risk is too great to the
unarmed officer. Pursuant to the form, permission to engage in outside employ-
ment that requires the officer to carry a firearm is revoked. The order becomes
effective upon its presentation to the officer and remains in effect until the officer is
otherwise advised by his commanding officer. See Los Angeles Police Department,
Employment Notification - Prohibition from Possessing, Shipping, Transporting or
Receiving a Firearm and/or Ammunition, form 70-01 88 2 (June 1997) (on file with
the Los Angeles Police Dept.).
66. See id.
67. See id. at 7.
68. In Los Angeles, three law enforcement officers, known only as Doe 1, Doe
2, and Doe 3, were the first law enforcement officers in the country to file a com-
plaint challenging the Lautenberg Amendment. See Complaint for Declaratory
and Injunctive Relief at 12-15, Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v.
Block, No. 96-9054 (D. Cal. 1996) (complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief).
In the past, two of the three had pled no contest to domestic violence charges and
the third had been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. See
Deputies Sue to Bar Enforcement of Gun Possession, AssOCIATED PREss, Dec. 26,
1996. The complaint challenged the Lautenberg Amendment as a violation of Con-
gress's power under the Commerce Clause, as an equal protection violation under
the Fourteenth Amendment, and as a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. See
Block, No. 96-9054 at 12-15. The complaint sought a declaratory judgment and
both preliminary and permanent injunctions prohibiting the defendants from de-
priving the individual plaintiffs from their positions as deputy sheriffs. See id. at
17-18. According to the attorney for the plaintiffs, Richard Shinee of Green &
Shinee, Encino, California, the court dismissed the complaint finding that the As-
sociation for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs had no standing to bring a cause of ac-
tion, and because the three deputies each had their records expunged, thus
15
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United States v. Smith,69 was a criminal case brought by the
government against a civilian defendant, charging him with, in-
ter alia, a violation of § 922 (g)(9). 70 On November 17, 1996, the
defendant shot his wife with a gun that he had purchased under
false pretenses by making false statements to a gun dealer in
connection with his purchase. 71 In 1994, he had pled guilty to a
misdemeanor assault upon his wife, 72 and at the time of his
purchase of the firearm, November 15, 1996, he was under in-
dictment for another crime punishable by a term of imprison-
ment exceeding one year.73 The defendant was thus prohibited
from, inter alia, possessing or receiving a weapon.74
In his motion to dismiss the indictment, the defendant
raised four issues, two of which are relevant here. 75 First, the
defendant argued that the simple assault to which he pled
guilty in 1994, does not have as an element the use or at-
tempted use of force nor the existence of a domestic relation-
ship. 76 Because the Iowa statute,77 under which he was charged
in 1994, could be violated in a non-violent manner, for example
rendering the issue moot. Telephone Interview with Richard Shinee, Partner in
the Green & Shinee law firm (Dec. 3, 1997).
69. 964 F. Supp. 286 (N.D. Iowa 1997).
70. See id. at 288.
71. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6). Smith, only twenty-one years of age as of No-
vember 1997, had assaulted the victim of this instant case many times, the first of
which was as early as 1993. In the instant matter, Smith shot his wife in the back,
the bullet passed through her chest, had come close to both her heart and aortic
artery, broke one of her ribs and punctured one of her lungs. Mrs. Smith neverthe-
less survived the incident. See U.S. Department of Justice, United States Attor-
ney's Office for the Northern District of Iowa, Press Release, Cedar Falls Man
Sentenced in First in the Nation Conviction Under New Federal Law (Nov. 21,
1997) at 1.
72. See Smith, 964 F.Supp. at 288. On September 13, 1994, Smith pushed his
wife, then grabbed her by the neck and threw her to the ground. See U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice, United States Attorney's Office for the Northern District of Iowa,
Press Release, Cedar Falls Man Sentenced in First in the Nation Conviction Under
New Federal Law (Nov. 21, 1997) at 1.
73. See Smith, 964 F. Supp. at 288; 18 U.S.C. § 922(n).
74. 18 U.S.C. §922(h).
75. See Smith, 964 F. Supp. at 288. The defendant also claimed that (1)
counts 2, 3, and 4 of the original indictment were multiplicitious and (2) he was not
under indictment for a crime punishable by more than one year and thus not in
violation of § 922(n). See Smith, 964 F. Supp. at 288.
76. See id.
77. The statute to which the defendant pled guilty in 1994, Iowa Code,
§ 708.1, provides that a person commits the crime of assault if he does any of the
following:
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offensive touching, the defendant argued that the statute had
no element of the use or attempted use of physical force and
thus his underlying conviction was not violative of 18 U.S.C.
§ 921(a)(33), the portion of the code that defines a misdemeanor
crime of domestic violence.78 Accordingly, the defendant argued,
there was no violation of § 922(g)(9) because there was no un-
derlying misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.7 9 The court
noted that because the 1994 assault, the predicate offense,
"clearly involved the use of force, it may qualify as a 'misde-
meanor crime of domestic violence' despite the fact that [the
Iowa statute] does not require the use of force as an element."80
Further, the defendant claimed that § 921(a)(33)'s lan-
guage was ambiguous in that the "as an element" language
modified both the use or attempted use of force and a domestic
relationship thereby calling for the predicate crime to have as
elements the use or attempted use of force as well as a domestic
relationship. 8' The Smith court found that the language modi-
fied only the force element, and thus the underlying predicate
crime need not have a domestic relationship element in the
statute itself8 2
The court also noted that pursuant to the legislative his-
tory, it was clear that the legislators, in enacting the law, in-
tended it to have broad application. 83 If the law mandated both
the elements of the use or attempted use of physical force and a
domestic relationship, as was brought to the Smith court's at-
tention in amici briefs, "only seventeen of the fifty states and
1) Any act which is intended to cause pain or injury to, or which is intended
to result in physical contact which will be insulting or offensive to an-
other, coupled with the apparent ability to execute the act.
2) Any act which is intended to place another in fear of immediate physical
contact which will be painful, injurious, insulting, or offensive, coupled
with the apparent ability to execute the act.
3) Intentionally points any firearm toward another, or displays in a threat-
ening manner any dangerous weapon toward another.
Smith, 964 F. Supp. at 289.
78. See supra note 14.
79. See Smith, 964 F. Supp. at 290.
80. Smith, 964 F. Supp. at 290. The 1994 assault involved the defendant
grabbing his wife by the throat, pushing her down, and restraining her. See
Smith, 964 F. Supp. at 290.
81. See id. at 291-92.
82. See id. at 292.
83. See id. at 293.
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Puerto Rico have a law that would qualify under section
921(a)(33)."8 4 Further, the court noted Senator Feinstein's
statement regarding the Amendment: "[tihis amendment looks
to the type of crime, rather than the classification of the convic-
tion. Anyone convicted of a domestic violence offense would be
prohibited from possessing a firearm."8 5 Finally, the court
looked at the fact that the earlier version of the law did not in-
clude the language "as an element, the use or attempted use of
physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon"8 6
Thus, the court concluded that the newly added "as an element"
language was not intended to apply to the domestic relationship
element.8 7
Second, the Smith defendant contended, in his motion to
dismiss the indictment, that "section 921(a)(33) is unconstitu-
tionally vague."88 Here, the defendant claimed that if the predi-
cate offense, Iowa statute 708.1, "can constitute a misdemeanor
crime of domestic violence, [then] §921(a)(33) is unconstitution-
ally vague"8 9 because a person of reasonable intelligence does
not have fair notice that his conduct is forbidden by statute, it
fails to establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement,
and it invites arbitrary and capricious enforcement. 90 The
Smith court rejected the defendant's argument and upheld the
statute, stating that the language employed by the statute, the
use or attempted use of physical force, is used in everyday lan-
guage and is thus readily understandable. 91 Moreover, the list
of people against whom the force needs to be directed to render
the conduct illegal is "clear and straightforward."92 The only
possible difficulty the court acknowledged was related to the de-
fendant's first argument, the possibility that § 921(a)(33) might
be understood to require both the use or attempted use of vio-
lence and a domestic relationship as elements.93 However, the
84. Id. at 293.
85. Smith, 964 F. Supp. at 293 (citations omitted).
86. Id.
87. See id. at 293.
88. Id. at 288.
89. Id. at 294.
90. See Smith, 964 F. Supp. at 294.
91. See id. at 294.
92. Id.
93. See id.
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court held that the fact that a statute may be interpreted in two
ways does not render it void for vagueness.9 4
Additionally, the court rejected the defendant's argument
that § 922(g)(9) was void for vagueness because it did not estab-
lish guidelines for law enforcement in enforcing the law.95
Based on many factors, including the statute's plain language,
the legislative history, and the ATF's interpretation of the stat-
ute, it is clear that the statute should be applied to anyone con-
victed of a misdemeanor crime involving the use or attempted
use of force against persons listed in § 921(a)(33).96 This, the
court held, "provides a bright line for law enforcement, and does
not encourage arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions."97
Thus, the statute was rendered constitutional by the Smith
court and the motion to dismiss the indictment was denied.98
Ultimately, the defendant was the first person in the nation to
be tried, convicted and sentenced for a violation of the
Lautenberg Amendment. 99
Similarly, in United States v. Meade,100 a defendant
charged with, inter alia, a violation of § 922(g)(9), filed a motion
to dismiss count one of the indictment pending against him,
contending that (1) his past conviction under Massachusetts
law does not qualify as a crime of domestic violence and (2) that
§ 922 (g)(9) violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Consti-
tution.101 The district court denied the defendant's motion. 10 2
94. See id. at 294 (quoting Williams v. Brewer, 442 F.2d 657, 660 (8th Cir.
1971)).
95. See Smith, 964 F. Supp. at 294.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See id. at 295.
99. See U.S. Department of Justice, United States Attorney's Office for the
Northern District of Iowa, Press Release, Cedar Falls Man Sentenced in First in
the Nation Conviction Under New Federal Law (Nov. 21, 1997). Smith was sen-
tenced to a term of fifty-one months in prison, with three years supervised release
upon his completion of his jail time. He was convicted of a federal crime, therefore
there is no possibility for parole. He was also required to pay restitution in the
amount of $4,619.31 and was ordered by the court to have no contact with the
victim. See id.
100. 986 F. Supp. 66 (D. Mass. 1997).
101. See id. at 67.
102. See id.
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In 1994, the defendant was convicted of the crime of assault
and battery against his wife. 03 On May 15, 1997, local police
received a 911 call and, as a result, arrested the defendant
while he was in front of his wife's home and in possession of a
handgun. 10 4 At the time of the arrest, the defendant was sub-
ject to a restraining order that prohibited him from having any
contact with his wife. 05 As a result of this arrest, he was
charged with many state offenses, but two months later, the
state charges were dismissed and the defendant was indicted in
federal court pursuant to § 922(g)(9). 10 6
The defendant challenged count one of the indictment,
charging him with a violation of § 922(g)(9), on two grounds. 10 7
First, he contended that the 1994 offense could not be a predi-
cate offense of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence be-
cause the Massachusetts statute under which he was charged
and convicted does not require proof of a domestic relationship
between the defendant and the victim. 0 8 Similar to the argu-
ment put forth by the Smith defendant, this defendant also ar-
gued that the "as an element" language of § 921(a)(33) modifies
both "the use or attempted use of physical force" and the do-
mestic relationship language. 10 9 The court felt that the plain
language of the statute demonstrated that Congress intended
the "as an element" language to modify only "the use or at-
tempted use of physical force" because "element" was written in
singular form was intended to modify only the element immedi-
ately following. 110
Further, as in Smith, the Meade court noted that from the
legislative record, it could be determined that Congress, in en-
acting the Lautenberg Amendment, intended to broaden the
category of individuals barred from possessing a firearm, not
limit it, as the defendant's interpretation would do."' Finally,
the Meade court also noted that the "as an element" and "the
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See Meade, 986 F. Supp. at 67.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 67.
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See Meade, 986 F. Supp. at 67-8.
111. See id. at 68.
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use or attempted use of physical force" language was added to
the statute just before it was passed, indicating that the "as an
element" language was intended to modify only the "use or at-
tempted use of physical force" element. 112
The defendant also challenged the constitutionality of
§ 922(g)(9) on the grounds that it is an ex post facto law in viola-
tion of the U.S. Constitution. 113 He argued that the statute in-
creased the punishment of his 1994 conviction by penalizing his
ability to possess a firearm and thus violates the Ex post Facto
Clause of the Constitution." 4 The court declared that in order
for a law to be ex post facto, it "must be retrospective - that is,
it must apply to events occurring before its enactment and it
must disadvantage the offender affected by it by altering the
definition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for
the crime."1 5 However, the court, relying on United States v.
Brady," 6 held "that section 922(g)(9) penalizes the possession of
the firearm after the date of enactment of the statute" and
therefore does not violate the Ex post Facto Clause of the U.S.
Constitution." 7 The possession was not prohibited until after
the date of the enactment of the Lautenberg Amendment."18
Based on the foregoing, the Meade court denied the defendant's
motion to dismiss. 1 9
In National Association of Government Employees, Inc. v.
Barrett,20 by letter dated January 10, 1997, Jacqueline Barrett,
Sheriff of Fulton County, Georgia, notified William Hiley that
he was dismissed from his position of seven years as deputy
sheriff effective at the close of business on January 14, 1997.121
The dismissal was "for cause," pursuant to Barrett's receipt of
ATF Director John Magaw's "Open Letter to All State and Local
112. See id. at 68-9.
113. See id. at 67.
114. See id. at 69.
115. Id. (citing Lynce v. Mathis, 117 S. Ct. 891, 896 (1997)).
116. 26 F.3d 282 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 894 (1994). Without
much detail, the court claims that the "Second Circuit's decision in Brady is in-
structive for its ex post facto analysis." Meade, 986 F. Supp. at 69.
117. Meade, 986 F. Supp. at 69.
118. See Meade, 986 F. Supp. at 69.
119. See id. at 66.
120. 968 F. Supp. 1564 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
121. See id. at 1568.
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Law Enforcement. " 122 The letter informed Hiley that "'[i]f an
employee authorized to carry a County-issued firearm and am-
munition is affected by [§ 922(g)(9)], the employee may not pos-
sess any firearm or ammunition and must return any County-
issued firearm or ammunition in accordance with Departmental
policy."1 23 The letter noted that Hiley had a misdemeanor con-
viction of domestic violence and further notified him that such a
conviction justified his being fired.' 24
Hiley first appealed his dismissal to the Fulton County Per-
sonnel Board and then he, with the National Association of Gov-
ernment Employees, Inc. ("NAGE"), commenced this action. 25
Plaintiffs sought to enjoin enforcement of § 922(g)(9), claiming
that the law was unconstitutional pursuant to six different
theories. 26
First, the plaintiffs asserted that in enacting § 922(g)(9),
Congress exceeded its power pursuant to the Commerce
Clause. 127 The plaintiffs raised this challenge under United
States v. Lopez, 28 which involved a statute enacted by Congress
that was held unconstitutional because it regulated the mere
possession of a firearm in a school zone. 129 The Barrett court did
not agree with plaintiffs' contention because, unlike the statute
in Lopez, § 922(g)(9) has a jurisdictional element that requires
the firearm to be "possessed 'in and affecting commerce' or re-
ceived after having 'been shipped or transported in interstate or
122. See id; see also supra note 33 and accompanying text.
123. Barrett, 968 F. Supp. at 1568 (quoting Hiley ATF., Attachment A).
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See id. at 1568-69, 1572. Upon commencement of this lawsuit, Fulton
County rescinded the termination and reassigned Hiley to a detention officer posi-
tion; a position that does not require him to possess a firearm. The reassignment
was the result of a settlement entered into by Hiley, Barrett, and Fulton County.
Hiley dismissed his claims with prejudice against Barrett and Fulton County. See
id. at 1569. NAGE, however, proceeded in an effort to "assert the claims of its
members who are similarly situated to Hiley." Barrett, 968 F. Supp. at 1570. The
court found that both Hiley and NAGE had standing to proceed. For a discussion
on the standing issue see pages at 1569-71; see also Fraternal Order of Police v.
United States, 981 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1997).
127. Barrett, 968 F. Supp. at 1572.
128. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). See Barrett, 968 F. Supp. at 1572.
129. Lopez, 514 U. S. at 549.
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foreign commerce.""130 This challenge to §922(g)(9) will be dis-
cussed at length below. 131
The plaintiffs' second challenge to the constitutionality of
§ 922(g)(9) was that it violates the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment 132 because:
(1) [it] irrationally distinguish[es] between persons convicted of
misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence and persons convicted of
other types of misdemeanor crimes of violence; (2) irrationally al-
low[s] felons, but not domestic violence misdemeanants, to pos-
sess a firearm once their civil rights [are] restored under the laws
of the relevant state; and (3) discriminate [s] against domestic vio-
lence misdemeanants who are law enforcement officers. 133
Neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right were involved.
Therefore, the Barrett court applied the rational basis standard
of review. 34 Because § 922(g)(9) can be reasonably justified by
any statement of facts and because "[1]egislation subject to ra-
tional basis review is presumptively constitutional," the Barrett
court held that the law passed an equal protection challenge
and was thus constitutional. 135 The court noted that domestic
violence misdemeanants are certainly set aside by Congress as
a class, but the court also found that the purpose of the law, to
wit, "protecting public safety," is rationally related to keeping
firearms out of the hands of domestic violence
misdemeanants.136
Under §922(g)(1) (felon in possession of a firearm) and
§ 922(g)(9) (domestic violence misdemeanant in possession),
both felons and domestic violence misdemeanants may be enti-
tled to possess a weapon if their records are expunged, the con-
viction is set aside, the defendant was pardoned, or their civil
rights were restored. 137 The plaintiffs noted that in some states,
while a felon's civil rights can be taken away, a misdemeanant's
130. Barrett, 968 F. Supp at 1572.
131. See infra Part III(A).
132. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
133. Barrett, 968 F. Supp. at 1572.
134. See id. at 1573 (citations omitted).
135. Id. at 1573, 1575 (citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426
(1961)).
136. Id. at 1573.
137. See id. at 1574.
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rights are not.138 Therefore, in these states, it would be possible
for a felon to possess a firearm upon having his civil rights re-
stored, but a misdemeanant, who never lost his civil rights, and
thus did not have them restored, cannot possess a weapon.
This, the plaintiffs claimed, was an unconstitutional anomaly,
violative of the Equal Protection Clause.139 However, the Bar-
rett court did not interpret it that way. Rather, the court noted
that because many states' laws are different, there are bound to
be anomalies such as this.140 Indeed, it recognized that the
states have different standards for expungement, pardon, and
restoration of civil rights and when such acts should be granted
to an offender.' 4 ' Although "Congress superimposed a patch-
work of state law over a broad piece of federal legislation in a
manner bound to produce anomalous results ... [t]he scheme is
nonetheless a rational one, notwithstanding its
imperfections." 4 2
The plaintiffs' final equal protection argument was that po-
lice officers were impermissibly discriminated against by
§ 922(g)(9). 143 The court found, however, that "[allthough the
ultimate effect of this facially neutral statute may be to bar cer-
tain domestic violence misdemeanants of a career that requires
the ability to possess a firearm legally," the seemingly uneven
consequences of a rationally based statute are ordinarily of lit-
tle constitutional concern - unless, of course, a discriminatory
purpose for the statute can be demonstrated. 4 4 For the forego-
ing reasons, the court found the statute passed constitutional
muster under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 45
The plaintiffs' third contention was that § 922(g)(9) violated
their due process rights. 4 6 Similar to the Equal Protection ar-
gument above, because no fundamental right is affected, the
138. Barrett, 968 F. Supp. at 1574.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. Id. (quoting McGrath v. United States, 60 F.3d 1005, 1009 (2d Cir. 1995),
cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1121 (1996).
143. See Barrett, 968 F. Supp. at 1575.
144. Id. at 1575 (citing Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney,
442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979)).
145. See id.
146. See id.
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statute was reviewed on a rational basis level.147 The statute
had already been found to be rationally related to a legitimate
governmental interest, as discussed above, and thus, the court
held that it survives the plaintiffs' due process challenge. 148
Plaintiffs' fourth challenge attacked § 922(g)(9) as a statute
violative of the Ex post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
Similar to the Meade court discussed above,149 the Barrett court
rejected this challenge pursuant to the Second Circuit's decision
in United States v. Brady150 and quoted the same: "[regardless
of the date of [the defendant's] prior conviction, the crime of be-
ing a felon in possession of a firearm was not committed until
after the effective date of the statute .. ."151 Thus, according to
the Barrett court, a defendant in violation of § 922(g)(9), by the
date of his § 922(g)(9) conviction, has more than adequate no-
tice that it was illegal for him to possess a weapon as a domestic
violence misdemeanant and as such could have made the deci-
sion to conform his conduct with the law and not possess a fire-
arm in violation thereof.152
Plaintiffs fifth challenge arose under a Bill of Attainder
theory, in that it inflicted a forbidden punishment upon
§ 922(g)(9) defendants. 153 The Barrett court stated that to de-
termine the validity of this claim it was necessary to determine:
(1) whether the challenged statute falls within the historical
meaning of legislative punishment; (2) whether the statute,
"viewed in terms of the type and severity of burdens imposed, rea-
sonably can be said to further nonpunitive legislative purposes;"
and (3) whether the legislative record "evinces a congressional in-
tent to punish."1 54
When the court applied these criteria, it found that § 922(g)(9)
was not a bill of attainder. 55 Historically, a bill of attainder
147. See id.
148. See Barrett, 968 F. Supp. at 1575.
149. See supra notes 100-19 and accompanying text.
150. 26 F.3d 282 (2d Cir. 1994).
151. Barrett, 968 F. Supp. at 1575. (quoting Brady, 26 F.3d at 291).
152. See id.
153. See id. at 1576-77.
154. Id. (quoting Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research
Group, 468 U.S. 841, 852 (1984) (quoting Nixon v. Adm'n of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S.
425, 473, 475-76 (1977))).
155. See id. at 1577.
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was used to impose the death penalty and lesser offenses were
imposed by "bills of pains and penalties," including imprison-
ment, banishment, and the punitive confiscation of property.156
The Bill of Attainder Clause of the U.S. Constitution rendered
these penalties unconstitutional when imposed upon a group or
a specific individual and "outlaws a legislative bar to participa-
tion by certain individuals or groups in specific employments or
professions."1 57 Section 922(g)(9) bars all domestic violence mis-
demeanants from possessing a firearm; the fact that it may also
block domestic violence misdemeanants from pursuing careers
as police officers does not rise to the level of being a violation of
the Bill of Attainder Clause.158 Moreover, because Congress
had "well-defined goals" and the statute was enacted in further-
ance thereof, it can reasonably be described as furthering
nonpunitive legislative purposes. 159 Finally, plaintiffs did not
allege and nowhere does the legislative history reveal an intent
of the Congress in enacting § 922(g)(9) of punishing persons
convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. 160 Thus,
the Bill of Attainder claim, according to the court, failed.161
The sixth, and final claim of the plaintiffs was that the stat-
ute violated the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution 16 2
as it usurped "powers reserved to the states." 63 The Barrett
court reasoned that because § 922(g)(9) was not violative of the
Commerce Clause and was thus a valid exercise of Congress'
commerce power, it cannot violate the Tenth Amendment. 64
In response to plaintiffs' six claims, the defendants as-
serted, inter alia, that pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure ("F.R.C.P.") 12(b)(6), plaintiffs' action should be dismissed
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 65
The district court agreed, finding as it must to so agree, that
156. Barrett, 968 F. Supp. at 1577.
157. Id.
158. See id. at 1577.
159. Id.
160. See id.
161. See Barrett, 968 F. Supp. at 1577.
162. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
163. Barrett, 968 F. Supp. at 1577.
164. See id.
165. See id. at 1572.
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plaintiffs could prove no set of facts in support of its claim of
unconstitutionality. 166 The court dismissed the plaintiffs' com-
plaint and denied their motion for a preliminary injunction as
moot.167 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Bar-
rett, adopting the district court's "thorough and well-reasoned
order.' 68
United States v. Hicks, 69 like the Smith case, involved a
civilian defendant who was charged, inter alia, with a violation
of § 922(g)(9). Hicks had, prior to the enactment of § 922(g)(9),
been convicted of a battery against his own son. 70 He argued
that § 922(g)(9) is an ex post facto law in violation of the U.S.
Constitution and claimed that at the time he committed the
battery, he had no notice of the future ramifications on his abil-
ity to later possess a firearm.' 71
The District Court for the District of Kansas held that it
was the activity of the post-enactment possession of the firearm
that was the crime being punished, not the pre-enactment mis-
demeanor crime of domestic violence. 172 Relying on the reason-
ing in United States v. Brady,173 the court held that the
Lautenberg Amendment is not violative of the Ex post Facto
clause of the U.S. Constitution and that the defendant had ade-
quate notice of the fact that his later actions were indeed crimi-
nal. 74 Hicks' motion to dismiss the charge was denied. 75
In Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis,176 a police officer who
had been on the force since 1971 brought an action against the
City of Indianapolis, the City's police department, and the chief
166. See id. at 1572, 1577.
167. See id. at 1577.
168. Hiley v. Barrett, 155 F.3d 1276-77 (11th Cir. 1998).
169. 992 F. Supp. 1244 (D. Kan. 1997).
170. See id.
171. See id. at 1245.
172. See id. at 1246-47.
173. 26 F.3d 282 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 894 (1994). Brady held
that "by [the date of the defendant's conviction under § 922(g)(1), defendant] had
more than adequate notice that it was illegal for him to possess a firearm because
of his status as a convicted felon, and he could have conformed his conduct to the
requirements of the law." Hicks, 992 F. Supp. at 1246 (quoting Brady, 26 F.3d at
291).
174. See Hicks, 992 F. Supp. at 1246.
175. See id.
176. 13 F. Supp.2d 811 (S.D. Ind. 1998).
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of police in an effort to retain his employment. 77 He faced los-
ing his position on the force due to a misdemeanor domestic vio-
lence conviction for a battery offense against his ex-wife and the
subsequent firearm restriction imposed by the Lautenberg
Amendment. 178 He claimed that the Lautenberg Amendment
was unconstitutional and moved for preliminary injunction to
keep the City from firing him. 79 The United States intervened
and both the City of Indianapolis and United States moved to
dismiss Gillespie's complaint. 80
In Count I of his complaint, Gillespie argued that the
Lautenberg Amendment "invades state sovereignty in violation
of the Tenth Amendment,"' 8 ' by supplanting state criminal law
by (1) defining what domestic violence is and establishing pen-
alties for crimes of the same, (2) dictating to the states the qual-
ifications for their state and local law enforcement personnel,
and (3) forcing the states to regulate a federal law. 8 2
First, the court found the federal government was not
amending state law, but rather was enacting new federal
laws. 83 States were still able to punish domestic violence
crimes as they did prior to the enactment of the Lautenberg
Amendment and therefore, there was no "compelled state legis-
lation." 84 Second, because the law regulated private behavior
of individuals, it was at the law enforcement agencies' discre-
tion as to what to do with the officers required to surrender
their firearms; the federal government has only removed the
ability to carry a firearm from convicted officers. 8 5 Finally, in
order to determine whether or not a statute may survive a
Tenth Amendment challenge that it forces states to enforce a
federal regulatory program, the court must determine that the
statute in question is (1) a proper exercise of one of Congress'
enumerated powers under the Commerce Clause and whether,
(2) as a result of the manner in which Congress created the fire-
177. See id. at 814.
178. See id. at 814-15.
179. See id. at 815.
180. See id. at 814-15.
181. Gillespie, 13 F. Supp.2d at 819.
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. Id. at 820.
185. See id.
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arm disability, the states were compelled to do something. 86
The Gillespie court found that the statute was indeed a proper
exercise and that it placed no requirement on the states or their
officials. "[Section] 922(g)(9) regulates the behavior of private
individuals, not states, for individuals will be prosecuted for vio-
lation of the statute and there is no federal mandate for states
to assist in regulation and enforcement." 18 7
Finally, Gillespie argued that Congress had previously,
pursuant to § 925(a)(1), exempted law enforcement officers from
firearms disabilities. 8 8 To no longer exempt those officials
under § 922(g)(9) was an "impermissible invasion of the states'
police power" and was therefore violative of the Tenth Amend-
ment. 8 9 While the court found this argument intriguing, it
noted first that there was no legal support for the argument and
second, that to give credence to this argument would be to spec-
ulate as to the intent of Congress when it enacted § 922(g)(9)
and failed to exempt law enforcement officers. 190 The Court fur-
ther found that legislative intent would not control anyway as
"Congress' belief regarding the constitutional limits of its own
powers is not dispositive as to those limits."191
Based on the foregoing, the court dismissed Count I of Gil-
lespie's complaint, holding § 922(g)(9) in accord with the Tenth
Amendment. 192
Count II of Gillespie's complaint asserted that § 922(g)(9) is
unconstitutional in that it exceeds Congress' power under the
Commerce Clause. 193 Gillespie claimed that there is no jurisdic-
tional element to § 922(g)(9) and it is therefore unconstitu-
tional. 194 The court cited numerous cases holding § 922(g)'s
jurisdictional nexus sufficient, 195 and dismissed Gillespie's Com-
merce Clause challenge.
186. See Gillespie, 13 F. Supp.2d at 820.
187. Gillespie, 13 F. Supp.2d at 820.
188. See id. at 821.
189. Id. at 821.
190. See id.
191. Id.
192. Gillespie, 13 F. Supp.2d at 821.
193. See id.
194. See id. at 821-22 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)).
195. See id. at 822, n.7. Each of the cited cases related to § 922(g)(1), the pro-
hibition against felons possession of a firearm.
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In Count Three of his complaint, Gillespie challenged the
statute under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment.196 Although Gillespie conceded that law enforcement of-
ficers were not a suspect class, he claimed that the statute
infringed on his fundamental right to bear arms under the Sec-
ond Amendment and his fundamental right to employment with
the Indianapolis Police Department. 197 Accepting the City's and
the United States' argument, based upon United States v.
Miller'9 and Lewis v. United States,199 the court held that the
"right to bear arms guaranteed by the Second Amendment is
not a fundamental right for equal protection purposes."200 Fur-
ther, the court noted that the Second Amendment "does not re-
quire [the court] to apply the compelling governmental interest
standard., 201
Gillespie further argued that strict scrutiny was required
because the statute effectively "deprives law enforcement per-
sonnel of their property interest in their employment where re-
ceipt and possession of a government issued firearm is usually
mandatory."20 2 The court rejected this argument, noting that
the Supreme Court has held there is no fundamental right to
public employment. 20 3
Finding a strict scrutiny analysis inapplicable, the court
analyzed the statute applying the rational basis standard and
rejected Gillespie's arguments that the statute singled out do-
mestic violence misdemeanors, thereby giving preferential
treatment to all other violent misdemeanor convicts. 20 4 Follow-
ing the Supreme Court's decision in F. C.C. v. Beach Communi-
cations, 20 5 the Gillespie court held that Congress "must be
allowed some leeway to approach a perceived problem incre-
196. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
197. See Gillespie, 13 F. Supp.2d at 822.
198. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
199. 445 U.S. 55 (1980).
200. Gillespie, 13 F. Supp.2d at 823.
201. Id. (quoting Sklar v. Byrne, 727 F.2d 633, 637 (7th Cir. 1984)).
202. Id. (quoting Plaintiffs Preliminary Injunction Brief at 29).
203. See id. (citing United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of Camden v.
Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 219 (1984)).
204. See id. at 824.
205. 508 U.S. 307 (1993).
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mentally."20 6 The court also rejected Gillespie's claim that the
statute unconstitutionally has a disproportionate impact on law
enforcement officers. 20 7 Unless Gillespie could show that Con-
gress had a discriminatory purpose in enacting § 922(g)(9),
which he did not, the court held that his rights under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment were not violated. 208
The court dismissed the equal protection claim in Count III of
Gillespie's complaint.20 9
Also in Count III, Gillespie challenged the statute's consti-
tutionality under due process. 210 Again, the court found that ra-
tional basis, not strict scrutiny analysis applied and, because
the statute satisfies the rational basis analysis, held that his
substantive due process argument was foreclosed. 21 Turning to
his procedural due process argument, the court held that "when
the legislature passes a law which affects a general class of per-
sons, those persons have all received procedural due process -
the legislative process." 212 Accordingly, Gillespie appears to
have had sufficient notice and opportunity for a hearing. This,
in conjunction with the fact that Gillespie had specified no fail-
ings in the police department's review process, the court held,
warranted the dismissal of the due process claim.21 3
Finally, Count III challenged § 922(g)(9) as violative of the
Bill of Attainder and Ex post Facto Clauses of the U.S. Consti-
tution.214 Because Gillespie argued these claims in neither his
motion for preliminary injunction nor his reply motion, the
court summarily dismissed the claims holding that Gillespie
abandoned them.215 The court did note that Gillespie no doubt
abandoned these claims "because the case law and legislative
206. Gillespie, 13 F. Supp.2d at 824 (quoting Beach Communications, 504 U.S.
at 316).
207. See id.
208. See id.
209. See id. at 824-25.
210. See id. at 825.
211. See Gillespie, 13 F. Supp.2d at 825.
212. Id. (quoting Brown v. Retirement Comm., 797 F.2d 521, 527 (7th Cir.
1986) (quoting J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 556
(1983))).
213. See id. at 825.
214. See id.
215. See id. at 826.
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history argue so clearly against [his] position."216 Further, in a
footnote, the court noted that even if it were to address Gilles-
pie's claims on the merits, those claims would indeed fail.217
In Count IV of his complaint, Gillespie claimed that his
Second Amendment right to bear arms was violated, both indi-
vidually and in his capacity as a police officer. 218 Though he
conceded in his preliminary injunction brief that there was no
personal right to bear arms, Gillespie nevertheless sought to
vindicate his right to bear arms "as someone whose possession
relates to a state militia, or in the alternative, the collective
right of the state to preserve and regulate the militia. ''219 The
court applied a strict scrutiny analysis and found that the stat-
ute was narrowly tailored to serve the compelling governmental
interest of keeping deadly weapons out of the hands of those
persons Congress believes to be dangerous. 220 Moreover, the
law prevents victims of domestic violence from being killed by
their attackers with a firearm, a concern that Congress found,
pursuant to various statistics, to be valid.22' The court accord-
ingly dismissed Gillespie's Second Amendment claim.222
Gillespie argued that § 922(g)(9) "operates to substantially
impair [his] oath-based contractual obligations" in violation of
Article I, § 10, Clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution. 223 The court
noted that the Clause applies only to the states and does not
operate as a restriction on the actions of the federal govern-
ment.224 A Contract Clause claim against a federal statute is
analyzed under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment.225 The party asserting such a claim "must overcome a
presumption of constitutionality and establish that the legisla-
216. Gillespie, 13 F. Supp.2d at 826.
217. See id. at n.11.
218. See id. at 826.
219. Id. at 826.
220. See id. at 827.
221. See Gillespie, 13 F. Supp.2d at 827.
222. See id.
223. "No state shall ... pass any... Law impairing the Obligation of Con-
tracts . . . ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
224. See Gillespie, 13 F. Supp.2d at 828 (citing Pension Benefits Guar. Corp.
v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 733 n.9 (1984)).
225. See id. (citing National R. R. Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Rail-
way, 470 U.S. 451, 472 (1985)).
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ture has enacted in an arbitrary and irrational way."226 Based
on the previous findings that § 922(g)(9) was not violative of his
procedural due process rights and not a compelled state legisla-
tion, the court dismissed Gillespie's Contract Clause claim.227
Finally, Gillespie claimed that § 922(g)(9) violated the Indi-
ana Constitution, which protected the right to bear arms and
prohibits both ex post facto laws and bills of attainder. 228 Be-
cause he did not raise this claim in his preliminary injunction
motion or his reply motions, the court deemed the claim aban-
doned and therefore dismissed it.229
Having dismissed all of Gillespie's claims, the court denied
his motion for a preliminary injunction as moot and granted the
City of Indianapolis' and the United States' motions to dis-
miss. 230 The Lautenberg Amendment survived yet another
challenge to its constitutionality.
In Fraternal Order of Police v. United States231 ("F.O.P."),
the facts appear to be quite similar to those in Barrett. Two
police officers, Fidel Ortega and Dennis Meerdter, had to turn
in their firearms pursuant to the enactment of § 922(g)(9). 232
They were either "reassigned to positions of lesser responsibil-
ity or put on leave."233 Additionally, when off-duty, they had
been unable to work as security guards because they could not
possess firearms.234 Further, Officer Ortega faced termination
upon the expiration of his leave.235 Both of these officers, also
members of the Fraternal Order of Police, have had prior misde-
meanor convictions of domestic violence. Their superiors, in
complying with § 922(g)(9), removed their firearms from them.
On their behalf, the Fraternal Order of Police sought to enjoin
the application of § 922(g)(9) against these and future officers
by attacking the constitutionality of the law.236
226. Id. at 828 (citing National R.R., 470 U.S. at 472).
227. See id.
228. See id.
229. See Gillespie, 13 F. Supp.2d at 828.
230. See id.
231. 981 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1997).
232. See id. at 3
233. Id.
234. See id.
235. See id.
236. See Fraternal Order of Police, 981 F. Supp. at 2.
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As in Barrett, the F.O.P. court rejected the Commerce
Clause contention, holding that the jurisdictional element in
§ 922(g)(9) was present.237 Therefore, the court held, a Lopez
challenge was misplaced. 238 The statute, the court held, passed
muster under the Commerce Clause.239
The plaintiffs' next challenge was that the statute violated
the Due Process Clause because it (1) infringed upon the F.O.P.
members' rights to possess firearms; (2) irrationally targeted
one class of misdemeanants who had committed crimes of vio-
lence; and (3) discriminated against law enforcement officers
who had in the past been convicted of misdemeanor crimes of
domestic violence. 240 The F.O.P. court again held, as did the
court in Barrett, that § 922(g)(9) should receive rational basis
review because it neither implicated a fundamental right nor
operated to the detriment of a suspect class. 241 The court noted
that the purpose of the statute was, like other gun control stat-
utes, to "[keep] . . . firearms out of the hands of categories of
potentially irresponsible persons."242 To pass muster under the
Equal Protection Clause, it is required only that a reasonable
state of facts could provide a rational basis for the classifica-
tion.243 Here, the classification seeks to protect family members
or other loved ones from a person who has previously demon-
strated a propensity for domestic violence. 244 Upon review of
§ 922(g)(9) by the Senate, Senator Lautenberg cited a study
that demonstrated that in households with a history of battery,
women were three times more likely to be killed if a gun was
present.245 Thus, the F.O.P. court determined that § 922(g)(9)
was rationally related to a reasonable set of facts, and therefore,
did not target a particular group of misdemeanants
unconstitutionally. 246
237. See id. at 4.
238. See id.
239. See id.
240. See id.
241. Fraternal Order of Police, 981 F. Supp. at 4-5.
242. Id. at 5 (quoting Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212, 220-21 (1976)).
243. See id.
244. See id. at 5.
245. See id.
246. See Fraternal Order of Police, 981 F. Supp. at 5.
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Additionally, the F.O.P. court held that § 922(g)(9) did not
disproportionately affect law enforcement officers who may be
required to carry a gun as a condition of their employment.247 A
disparate impact of a law that is neutral on its face, the court
noted, is not unconstitutional unless the "uneven effect" has
some discriminatory purpose behind it.248 Because no discrimi-
natory purpose was alleged by the plaintiffs, the court held that
this claim failed.249
The plaintiffs' final contention was that § 922(g)(9) violated
the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.250 The court
held that this claim failed because the statute requires no ac-
tion by the state in the enforcement of the statute.251 The only
portion of the statute that required action by state officials was
already deemed unconstitutional and was invalidated by the
U.S. Supreme Court decision in Printz v. United States.252 Sec-
tion 922(g)(9) does not, the F.O.P. court held, violate the Tenth
Amendment.253
For all these reasons, therefore, the F.O.P. court denied
the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and granted
the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The F.O.P. de-
cision was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia ("the D.C. Circuit").254 After making the
initial finding that the Fraternal Order of Police ("the Order")
indeed had standing to bring the instant action, it held 18 U.S.C
§ 925 unconstitutional "insofar as it purports to withhold the
public interest exception from those [individuals] convicted of
domestic violence misdemeanors."255 In other words, because
through § 925, any agent or officer of the "United States or any
department or agency thereof or any State or any department,
agency or political subdivision thereof '25 6 are not exempt from
247. See id.
248. Id.
249. See id.
250. See id.
251. See Fraternal Order of Police, 981 F. Supp. at 5.
252. 521 U.S. 898 (1997); see also supra note 13.
253. See Fraternal Order of Police, 981 F. Supp. at 5.
254. See Fraternal Order of Police v. United States, 152 F.3d 998 (D.C. Cir.
1998) ("F.O.P. IF').
255. Id. at 1004.
256. 18 U.S.C. § 925(a)(1).
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the restriction of, inter alia, § 922(g)(9), § 925 is
unconstitutional.
The D.C. Circuit reasoned, on equal protection grounds,
that while rational basis is the proper level of scrutiny on which
to base its analysis, the "1996 amendments fall into the narrow
class of provisions that fail even the most permissive, 'rational
basis,' review."25 7 The court's difficulty with the statute seemed
to be that while the law strips law enforcement officers con-
victed of misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence of their guns,
and subsequently, their jobs, it does not have the same effect on
law enforcement officers convicted of domestic violence felonies.
"No reason [was] offered for imposing the heavier liability on
the lighter offense," so the court found the statutes defective for
their "neglect of more severe crimes of domestic violence." 258
The D.C. Circuit essentially found the statute "underinclusive,"
and therefore, unconstitutional.
On April 16, 1999, the D.C. Circuit reversed itself,259 hold-
ing that the "challenged provisions do satisfy rational basis re-
view,"260 and denied the Fraternal Order of Police's arguments
that 922(g)(9) violates due process by burdening the fundamen-
tal right to bear arms,261 that it usurps Congressional power
under the Commerce Clause, 262 and finally, that 922(g)(9) vio-
lates the Tenth Amendment. 263
D. Proposed Amendments to Section 922(g)(9)
On January 7, 1997, Representative Robert Barr (R-Ga.)
introduced H.R. 26 to the U.S. House of Representatives. The
stated purpose of the bill is to amend § 922(g)(9) 264 "to provide
that the firearms prohibitions applicable by reason of a domes-
tic violence misdemeanor conviction do not apply if the convic-
257. F.O.P. 11, 152 F.3d at 1002.
258. Id. at 1002-03.
259. See Fraternal Order of Police v. United States, No. 97cv00145, 1999 WL
218442 (D.C. Cir. April 16, 1999).
260. Id. at *1.
261. Id. at *6-7.
262. Id. at *9.
263. Id. at *8.
264. The bill also seeks to amend 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(d)(9), (g)(9), (s)(3)(B)(i).
See H.R. 26, 105th Cong. (1997).
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tion occurred before the prohibitions became law."265 Thus,
according to the proposed bill, if a person committed a misde-
meanor crime of domestic violence before September 28, 1996,
the crime could not constitute the predicate act for § 922(g)(9).
Therefore, a person with such a conviction could legally possess
or receive a firearm. Upon being introduced to the House of
Representatives, the bill was sent to the House Committee on
the Judiciary for review.
Representative Helen Chenoweth (R-Idaho), also an oppo-
nent to the Lautenberg amendment, seeks its repeal. 266 On
March 11, 1997, Representative Chenoweth introduced H.R.
1009, titled the "States Rights and Second and Tenth Amend-
ment Restoration Act of 1997."267 H.R. 1009's stated purpose is
to repeal the Lautenberg Amendment. 268
While agreeing with the basic premise that domestic vio-
lence is a "very serious problem in the United States," H.R.
1009 offers many reasons for the repeal of the Lautenberg
Amendment. 269 Under H.R 1009, § 2(a), Congressional Find-
ings, it is noted that states do not classify domestic violence
crimes uniformly.270 What may be a misdemeanor crime of do-
mestic violence in one state may be a felony in another. Thus,
the bill reasons, states are the proper authority, not the federal
government, to classify domestic violence crimes. 271 The bill
goes one step further, however, and proposes that where appli-
cable, states should classify domestic violence offenses as
felonies.272
H.R. 1009 also proposes that the Lautenberg Amendment
be repealed because Congress has overstepped its bounds in
that no nexus has been made between domestic violence and
interstate commerce. 273 In a related argument, the bill states
that Congress has overstepped its power under both the Tenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted
265. H.R. 26, 105th Cong. (1997).
266. See H.R. 1009, 105th Cong. (1997).
267. See id.
268. See id.
269. See id.
270. See id. § 2(a).
271. See H.R. 1009 § 2(a)(2).
272. See id. § 2(a)(3).
273. See id. § 2(a)(4).
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by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Lo-
pez, 274 and the Commerce Clause.275 Other grounds for repeal
under H.R. 1009 include a finding that the Lautenberg Amend-
ment is an unfunded mandate, and the states, as the bill notes,
are responsible for the expenses incurred in enforcing the
law. 276 The bill also calls the law an ex post facto law "because
it imposes a criminal penalty on crimes which were not subject
to that penalty at the time of the Act,"277 and, accordingly, will
"result in the disarming of millions of citizens" including bat-
tered women, who need their weapons in order to protect them-
selves from their battering husbands, law enforcement officers,
and American servicemen. 27  Finally, H.R. 1009 finds that the
Lautenberg Amendment "ignores the real problem surrounding
domestic violence in that truly violent offenders are allowed to
plea-bargain down to misdemeanors." 279 H.R. 1009 is currently
co-sponsored by thirty-five members of Congress and is now be-
ing considered by the House Committee on the Judiciary. 280
It is under this background that the validity of the
Lautenberg Amendment, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) is reviewed.
III. Analysis
A. Congress'Enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) was a
Proper Exercise of Its Power Under the Commerce
Clause
Upon the United States Supreme Court's rendering its de-
cision in United States v. Lopez,28' the legal community vehe-
mently challenged any Congressional enactment as a
usurpation of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause.
Law professors asked their students what impact this new case
would have on Congress' ability to enact laws, and the truth of
the matter is, it really has had no colossal effect on Congress'
274. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
275. H.R. 1009, 105th Cong. §§ 2(a)(5), (6) (1997).
276. See id. § 2(a)(9).
277. Id. § 2(a)(10).
278. Id. §§ 2(a)(12), (13), (15).
279. Id. § 2(a)(16).
280. See Letter from Helen Chenoweth, et al., Congress of the Unted States,
House of Representatives (May 7, 1997) at attachment, Co-Sponsers on H.R. 1009.
281. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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ability. Rather, Lopez is a decision that reinforces the constitu-
tional definition of Congress's power under the Commerce
Clause.28 2
Lopez involved a challenge to the Gun-Free School Zones
Act of 1990, which made it a federal offense "for any individual
knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual
knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone."28 3
Upon being indicted by a federal grand jury, the defendant
moved to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the law
was unconstitutional because it was beyond Congress's power to
control the public schools.28 4 The district court denied the mo-
tion to dismiss the indictment and, pursuant to a bench trial,
found him guilty as charged. 28 5 The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's decision, finding the
law to be beyond Congress's power to regulate commerce. 28 6
The Supreme Court then granted certiorari and affirmed the
Fifth Circuit's ruling.28 7
In defining the extent of Congress's power to regulate inter-
state commerce, the Supreme Court noted that
the scope of the interstate commerce power "must be considered
in the light of our dual system of government and may not be ex-
tended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indi-
rect and remote that to embrace them, in view of our complex
society, would effectually obliterate the distinction between what
282. See United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 685 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. de-
nied, 117 S. Ct. 46, 47 (1996).
283. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A)(1988)). The
challenge arose out of an incident involving a twelfth-grade student who arrived at
his high school carrying a concealed .38 caliber handgun with five bullets. School
authorities received an anonymous tip to this effect, confronted the student, and
the student admitted to possessing the handgun. He was charged with possessing
a firearm on school property under Texas state law. The state charges were dis-
missed and the student was charged in a federal complaint with violating
§ 922(q)(1)(A). The student was then indicted by a federal grand jury on one count
of knowing possession of a firearm in a school zone in violation of § 922(q)(1)(A).
See id. at 551.
284. See id.
285. See id. at 551-52.
286. See id. at 552.
287. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552.
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is national and what is local and create a completely centralized
government."288
The Supreme Court has "heeded that warning and undertaken
to decide whether a rational basis existed for concluding that a
regulated activity sufficiently affected interstate commerce." 289
The Court then identified three broad categories that Congress
could legitimately regulate without usurping its own power.
The first was "the use of the channels of interstate commerce;"
the second was the power "to regulate and protect the instru-
mentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in in-
terstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from
intrastate activities;" and the third includes Congress's power
to regulate those activities that have a substantial effect on
commerce. 290 Chief Justice Rehnquist cited cases in support of
each of the three categories, yet noted that the third category,
under which the statute both at issue in the Lopez case and
herein falls, had a history of case law that was not completely
clear.291 From the legal precedence, it was unclear whether an
activity must simply affect or substantially affect interstate
commerce in order to be within Congress's power to regulate. In
a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court decided that an activ-
ity must have a substantial effect, and not merely an effect, on
commerce in order for Congress to have the power to regulate
it.292
The quick answer, under the first category of Lopez, is that
the Lautenberg Amendment passes constitutional muster be-
cause, unlike the statute at issue in Lopez, the Lautenberg
Amendment has a jurisdictional element.293 The Lopez Court
noted that § 922(q) "by its terms ha[d] nothing to do with 'com-
merce"' 294 and "contain[ed] no jurisdictional element which
288. Id. at 557 (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. 1, 37
(1937)); see also United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111 (1942). Both Darby and Wickard hold that Congress may regulate
activity that has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. See Darby, 312 U.S.
at 119-20; Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125.
289. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557.
290. Id. at 558-59.
291. See id. at 559.
292. See id.
293. See Fraternal Order of Police v. United States, 981 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D.D.C.
1997).
294. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
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would ensure... that the firearm possession in question affects
interstate commerce." 295 The statute at issue herein, however,
has such a jurisdictional element;296 it renders illegal for a per-
son convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence "to
ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess
in or affecting commerce, any firearms or ammunition; or to re-
ceive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or
transported in interstate or foreign commerce."297 Thus, as the
courts in Barrett and F.O.P. held, the instant statute has what
the statute in Lopez lacked and is therefore constitutional
under the Commerce Clause.298
Opponents to the Lautenberg Amendment 299 also contest
Congress' enactment of the law because in their view, pursuant
to the third category in Lopez, the act of domestic violence does
not have a substantial effect on interstate commerce, and there-
fore is not within Congress's power to regulate.300 This argu-
ment, however, is incorrect both in fact and in law.301 According
to a report by the American Medical Association dated October,
1994, it was estimated that each year, domestic violence costs
the United States five to ten billion dollars in "health care costs,
lost productivity, and criminal justice interventions."30 2 Each
year, domestic violence "is responsible for more than 192,000
assaults, 21,000 hospitalizations, 99,800 hospital days, and
39,900 emergency room visits." 30 3
It is likely that a woman who is a victim of a domestic vio-
lence incident will miss a day of work, if not more, due to an
embarrassing bruise or injuries so serious that she is unable to
295. Id.
296. See Fraternal Order of Police, 981 F. Supp. at 4.
297. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).
298. See National Ass'n of Gov't Employees, Inc. v. Barrett, 968 F. Supp. 1564,
1572 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (holding that the statute had a jurisdictional element and
was thus constitutional); Fraternal Order of Police, 981 F. Supp. at 4 (a jurisdic-
tional element was present which allowed the statute to pass muster under the
Commerce Clause).
299. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).
300. See supra Part II(D).
301. See supra Part II(C).
302. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, FACTS You SHOULD KNOw ABOUT Do-
MESTIC VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 1 (1994) (on file in the Pace University School of Law
Battered Women's Justice Center).
303. Id.
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work. 304 If the company for which she works deals in interstate
commerce, the incident that caused her to remain out of work
has an effect on interstate commerce. If the woman is out of
work for any length of time, her superiors are forced to either
work with one less person, which affects productivity, or per-
haps deal with a temporary employment agency, which would
force that particular company to spend additional funds where
they had not otherwise intended. Also in support of this state-
ment is a conference report from the U.S. House of Representa-
tives in their consideration of the Violent Crime Control and
Law Enforcement Act of 1994:
[C]rimes of violence motivated by gender have a substantial ad-
verse effect on interstate commerce, by deterring potential victims
from traveling interstate, from engaging in employment in inter-
state business, and from transacting with business, and in places
involved, in interstate commerce; crimes of violence motivated by
gender have a substantial adverse effect on interstate commerce,
by diminishing national productivity, increasing medical and
other costs, and decreasing the supply of and demand for inter-
state products. 30 5
In further support of the claim that domestic violence substan-
tially effects interstate commerce, 1985 statistics from the Na-
tional Family Violence Resurvey by the Department of Criminal
Justice demonstrated that victims of domestic violence
spent twice as many days in bed as other women; reported being
in poor health three times as often as other women; had twice as
many headaches, four times the rate of depression, and four and a
half times more suicide attempts. Among abused women sur-
veyed, 9.3% reported taking time off from their jobs because of
domestic violence, with 19% of those who were severely assaulted
spending time away from work.306
304. See generally Senate Hearing 101-939, Part I, Hearing before the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, on Legislation to Reduce the Grow-
ing Problem of Violent Crime Against Women, 101st Cong. 68-69 (June 20, 1990)
(statement of NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund on Violence Against
Women).
305. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994), reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N 1839, 1853.
306. Senate Hearing 101-939, Part I, Hearing before the Committee on the Ju-
diciary, United States Senate, on Legislation to Reduce the Growing Problem of
Violent Crime Against Women, 101st Cong. 68-69 (June 20, 1990) (statement of
NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund on Violence Against Women).
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From these facts, it is abundantly clear that domestic violence
has an impact on interstate commerce.
Moreover, in the many cases that have challenged the va-
lidity of the Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA"), 3o7 a statute
aimed at ending violence against women by, inter alia, fighting
the horrors of domestic violence, challenges have been made
under Lopez, arguing that VAWA is an unconstitutional exercise
of Congressional power over interstate commerce. In five dis-
trict court cases, the courts upheld the constitutionality of
VAWA as a legitimate exercise of Congress' power over inter-
state commerce because they found that domestic violence has a
substantial effect on interstate commerce. 308
The Lopez court also found that, while the government is
not required to make formal findings as to the substantial effect
of a particular activity on interstate commerce, such findings
were clearly lacking in Lopez. 309 However, as demonstrated
above, that is not the case here. 310 Many of the district court
cases in which VAWA was challenged took into account the
many congressional findings that explained the substantial ef-
fect of domestic violence upon interstate commerce. 31' Indeed,
some of the findings quoted above, in support of the proposition
307. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
308. See Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608, 613 (D. Conn. 1996); United States v.
Gluzman, 953 F. Supp. 84, 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Doe v. Hartz, 970 F. Supp. 1375,
1422 (N.D. Iowa 1997), rev'd in part and vacated in part on other grounds by Nos.
97-3086, 97-3087, 1998 WL 24118 (8th Cir. Jan. 26, 1998); Seaton v. Seaton, 971 F.
Supp 1188, 1193 (E. D. Tenn. 1997); Anisimov v. Lake, 982 F. Supp. 531, 538 (N.D.
Ill. 1997). One other district court case that held VAWA unconstitutional pursuant
to Lopez was reversed by the Fourth Circuit court and, like the aforementioned
cases, the court found domestic violence to have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. and State Univ., 935 F.
Supp. 779, 801 (W.D. Va. 1996), rev'd, 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997). On rehearing,
however, the Fourth Circuit vacated its decision, holding that in enacting Subtitle
C of VAWA, Congress exceeded its constitutional authority. See Brzonkala v. Vir-
ginia Polytechnic Inst. and State Univ., Nos. 96-2316, 96-1814, 1999 WL 111891,
at *73 (4th Cir. March 5, 1999). Two other circuit courts have upheld VAWA's con-
stitutionality, but not pursuant to Lopez. See United States v. Wright, 128 F.3d
1274, 1276 (8th Cir. 1997) (reversing the district court's decision that VAWA was
unconstitutional); United States v. Bailey, 112 F.3d 758, 766 (4th Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 240 (1997).
309. 514 U.S. 549, 562-63 (1995).
310. See supra notes 302-08 and accompanying text.
311. See Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 613-14; Gluzman, 953 F. Supp. at 88; Hartz, 970
F. Supp. at 1421-22; Seaton, 971 F. Supp. at 1192; Anisimov, 982 F. Supp. at 537-
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that domestic violence does have a substantial effect on inter-
state commerce, were findings relied upon by Congress in its
hearings regarding the enactment of VAWA and other related
statutes.312
For the foregoing reasons, § 922(g)(9) was a proper exercise
of Congressional power under the Commerce Clause of the
United States Constitution.
B. The Lautenberg Amendment Does Not Violate the Tenth
Amendment
House Bill 1009 contends that § 922(g)(9) is an "unfunded
federal mandate" to the states, requiring them to enforce a fed-
eral law at their own expense, which of course is prohibited pur-
suant to the Tenth Amendment. 313 This statement is incorrect,
however, because a review of the statute and indeed all of the
correspondence from the ATF to all state and local law enforce-
ment agencies show no commanding language with respect to
the Lautenberg Amendment. 3 4 State law enforcement agencies
were notified of the new law, but they were not required to pro-
spectively seek out officers in their ranks with misdemeanor do-
mestic violence convictions; rather the burden of disarming the
officers laid with the individual officers. 315 The statute merely
declares that for a person with a misdemeanor conviction of do-
mestic violence, it shall be unlawful to possess a firearm or am-
munition.31 6 To the extent that state law enforcement agencies
act to remove such officers, it is of their own volition. 317 More-
over, to the extent that states were required to enforce a federal
law, such a requirement was invalidated in Printz v. United
States.318
Additionally, cases have held that where a statute is a valid
exercise of Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause, it
is not violative of the Tenth Amendment. 319 In United States v.
312. See supra notes 302-08 and accompanying text.
313. H.R. 1009, 105' Cong. (1997).
314. See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
315. See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
316. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).
317. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
318. 521 U.S. 898 (1997); see also supra note 20.
319. See National Ass'n of Gov't Employees, Inc. v. Barrett, 968 F. Supp. 1564,
1577-78 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (citing United States v. Collins, 61 F.3d 1379, 1384 (9th
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Collins,320 the Ninth Circuit rejected a claim that § 922(g)(1),
the statute prohibiting felons from possessing a firearm, vio-
lated the Tenth Amendment because "the statute encroach[ed]
on the authority of [the State ofil Montana to decide who shall
possess firearms and what effect the state should give to felony
convictions from other states."321 The Collins court held, how-
ever, that because the statute was a valid exercise of Congress'
power under the Commerce Clause, it was not violative of the
Tenth Amendment.322
For the foregoing reasons, the Lautenberg Amendment
does not violate the Tenth Amendment.
C. Section 922(g)(9) is Not an Ex post Facto Law
The ex post facto prohibition of the United States Constitu-
tion forbids both Congress and the fifty states to enact laws
"'which imposes a punishment for an act which was not punish-
able at the time it was committed.' 323 By including the Ex post
Facto Clause in the Constitution, the Framers sought to ensure
that legislative acts would give fair warning as to the effect of a
law and would allow individuals to rely upon their meanings
until such laws were explicitly changed. 324 In order for a law to
be considered ex post facto, it must have two critical elements:
(1) it must be retrospective, meaning that it applies to events
occurring before its enactment, and (2) it must disadvantage an
offender affected by it.325 The ultimate question is "whether the
law changes the legal consequences of acts completed before its
effective date."326 Critical to the granting of relief to a defend-
ant is not his individual right "to less punishment, but the lack
Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1000 (1995); Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1520
(11th Cir. 1995)).
320. 61 F.3d 1379 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1000 (1995).
321. Id. at 1383.
322. See id. at 1384; see also United States v. Hanna, 55 F.3d 1456 (9th Cir.
1995) (holding that because the statute was valid exercise of Congress' commerce
power, it did not violate the Tenth Amendment); Columbia River Gorge United -
Protecting People and Property v. Yeutter, 960 F.2d 110, 114 (9th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 506 U.S. 863 (1992); Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1521.
323. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28 (1981) (quoting Cummings v. Mis-
souri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 325-26 (1866)).
324. See id. at 28-29.
325. See id. at 29.
326. Id. at 31.
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of fair notice and governmental restraint when the legislature
increases punishment beyond what was prescribed when the
crime was consummated."327
In United States v. Brady,328 which was relied upon by both
the Meade and Barrett courts,329 a defendant who had a 1951
felony conviction contested the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1),
pursuant to the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution, which
prohibited anyone convicted of a felony from possessing a fire-
arm.33 0 The statute at issue herein, § 922(g)(9), is very similar
to § 922(g)(1) in that someone previously convicted of a misde-
meanor crime of domestic violence prior to the enactment of the
statute, could later be convicted of being a misdemeanant in
possession of a firearm. What Brady held was that it was not
the underlying activity, the predicate offense, that was being
punished, but rather the subsequent possession of a firearm.331
The crime of being a "felon in possession" by the Brady defend-
ant was not committed until after the effective date of the stat-
ute under which he was convicted and hence could not be an ex
post facto crime. 332 The same analysis would follow for a de-
fendant, such as Smith or Meade, who was convicted under
§ 922(g)(9). It was not the crime of domestic violence that was
being further punished, but the possession of a firearm after
the date of the enactment of § 922(g)(9) that was being pun-
ished. Thus, defendants convicted under §§ 922(g)(1) or (g)(9)
are not entitled to relief under the Ex post Facto Clause because
they have adequate notice that their possession of a firearm is
illegal.
The Brady court determined that in enacting the "felon in
possession" statute, Congress intended the statute to prohibit
felons from possessing firearms, even those whose felony convic-
tions occurred prior to effective date of statute.333 Similarly,
Congressional intent concerning domestic violence misdemean-
ants is clear. Congress intended that anyone convicted of a mis-
327. Id. at 30.
328. 26 F.3d 282 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 894 (1994).
329. See supra notes 100-68 and accompanying text.
330. See Brady, 26 F.3d at 285.
331. See id. at 291.
332. See id.; see also United States v. Gillies, 851 F.2d 492, 495 (1st Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 857 (1988).
333. See Brady, 26 F.3d at 291.
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demeanor crime of domestic violence, both those already
convicted and those to be convicted in the future, should be
banned from possessing a firearm. 334  Senator Frank
Lautenberg, speaking before Congress and discussing one of
"three major loopholes" proposed by opponents to his law, noted
that
opponents of the gun ban proposed to limit the ban only to offend-
ers who had been notified of the ban when they originally were
charged. This effectively would have exempted all currently con-
victed offenders from the ban .... In effect, gun ban opponents
wanted to say that ignorance of the law would be an excuse for
wife beaters, even though it is not an excuse for anybody else.
Eventually, this proposal, too, was dropped.335
Clearly, Congress intended for anyone, past or present, con-
victed of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence to be af-
fected by the ban. The proposition that this is not violative of
the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution is supported by
United States v. Huss,336 which, quoting Cases v. United
States,337 held that
if a statute "is a bona fide regulation of conduct which the legisla-
ture has power to regulate, it is not bad as an ex post facto law
even though the right to engage in the conduct is made to depend
on past behavior, even behavior before the passage of the regula-
tory act.338
The Huss court held that the past conduct must be relevant to
the regulated activity and if it is not, it will be assumed that the
purpose of the statute is to impose additional punishment. 339
Huss effectively ties both the interstate commerce and ex
post facto claims of a defendant together. As discussed above,
Congress does have the power to regulate domestic violence be-
cause it effects interstate commerce. 340 Moreover, domestic vio-
lence is perhaps most dangerous when a firearm is involved. A
person who has demonstrated violence in the past and who cur-
334. See 142 CONG. REC. S11,872-01 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of
Sen. Lautenberg).
335. Id. (emphasis added).
336. 7 F.3d 1444 (9th Cir. 1993).
337. 131 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1942).
338. Huss, 7 F.3d at 1447 (quoting Cases, 131 F.2d at 921).
339. See id. at 1448.
340. See supra Part III(A).
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rently possesses a firearm is especially dangerous to his or her
potential victim and should therefore be prohibited from pos-
sessing a firearm. Thus, it is clear that Congress' enactment of
the Lautenberg Amendment was not intended to be punitive to
a person with a prior conviction of domestic violence but rather
regulatory, with an interest in "sav[ing] the life of another per-
son,"341 to wit, a victim of domestic violence. The Lautenberg
Amendment does not impose further punishment for prior
crimes, but furthers substantial and legitimate interests in
preventing the misuse of firearms.
For the foregoing reasons, the Lautenberg Amendment sur-
vives any defendant's claim that it is violative of the Ex Post
Facto Clause of the United States Constitution.
D. The Lautenberg Amendment Violates Neither the Equal
Protection Clause nor the Due Process Clause of the
U.S. Constitution
Law enforcement officers faced with the prospect of losing
their jobs are likely to contest the constitutionality of the
Lautenberg Amendment as a violation of either the Equal Pro-
tection Clause or the Due Process Clause of the United States
Constitution. For the following reasons, either argument would
fail and the constitutionality of the statute would be upheld, as
it indeed has been with the exception of the D.C. Circuit.342
As noted by the court in Barrett, any equal protection claim
by a law enforcement officer contending application of
§ 922(g)(9) against him, or any organization doing so on behalf
of him or others similarly situated to him, would have to do so
under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause because it is
the Fifth Amendment, not the Fourteenth, that places equal
protection limitations upon the federal government. 343 In re-
341. 142 CONG. REC. S11,872-01 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Lautenberg).
342. See Fraternal Order of Police v. United States, 152 F.3d 998 (D.C. Cir.
1998).
343. See National Ass'n of Gov't Employees, Inc. v. Barrett, 968 F. Supp. 1564,
1572 n.10 (N.D. Ga. 1997); Fraternal Order of Police v. United States, 981 F. Supp.
1, 4 (D.D.C. 1997) (citing Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 94 n.1 (1979)). The Bar-
rett court noted that a Due Process discussion was unnecessary in light of the
equal protection analysis that was made before it. See Barrett, 968 F. Supp. at
1572 n.10. The Due Process argument in F.O.P., being very similar to the Equal
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viewing an equal protection claim, the court must first deter-
mine under which standard of review a classification should be
evaluated. 34 4 In order for the court to review a classification
under strict scrutiny, the classification must involve the in-
fringement of a fundamental right, or concern a suspect class.34 5
Any attempt, such as by the plaintiff in Barrett, to examine the
Lautenberg Amendment under strict scrutiny analysis, how-
ever, is incorrect. In Barrett, the plaintiff in support of its equal
protection claim, attempted to have the classification reviewed
under strict scrutiny, claiming that the right to public employ-
ment and the right to bear arms were both fundamental
rights.346 As that court, and many others before it found, there
is no fundamental right to either public employment 347 or to
bear arms.348
Moreover, under strict scrutiny analysis, suspect classes
are those classes which: (1) have been historically subject to dis-
crimination; (2) have an obvious or immutable characteristic
which defines the class as a discrete group; or (3) are a politi-
cally powerless minority.349 The class involved here includes
any person convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic vio-
lence and the subgroup discussed herein includes all law en-
forcement officers that fall into that main class. Neither the
main group of domestic violence misdemeanants nor the sub-
group of police officers can possibly be classified within one of
the three categories mentioned above. Indeed, police officers
who clearly fall into neither of the first two categories, have a
very powerful political voice, the Fraternal Order of Police,
which has been characterized as the nation's largest police or-
Protection analysis in Barrett, demonstrates that there is no need to go into an
extended analysis of both. See id. A Due Process claim would be analyzed under
the same rational basis review and would yield the same result as the Equal Pro-
tection analysis discussed herein.
344. See Attorney Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 906 n.6 (1986).
345. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312
(1976).
346. See Barrett, 968 F. Supp. at 1573 n.11.
347. See Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979); Massachusetts
Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976).
348. See Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65 n.8 (1980); United States v.
Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (no fundamental right to bear arms unless in fur-
therance of preserving a well regulated militia).
349. See Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986).
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ganization, 350 implying of course that there are other police or-
ganizations that give law enforcement officers a public, political
voice. Thus, law enforcement does not fall into the third
category.
Because the Lautenberg Amendment involves neither a
fundamental right nor a suspect class, review of its validity
should be done under a rational basis standard.351 A classifica-
tion need only be rationally related to a legitimate state interest
to be valid,352 and under rational basis review, there is a strong
presumption in favor of the classification's validity.353 Rational
basis review is not a license for a reviewing court to be a
"superlegislature," rather the court must merely be able to see a
rational relationship between the disparity of the treatment
and some legitimate governmental purpose.354 Moreover, "the
Equal Protection Clause does not demand for purposes of ra-
tional-basis review that a legislature ... actually articulate at
any time the purpose or rationale supporting its classifica-
tion;"355 it is under no obligation to produce empirical data to
support the legislation. 35 6 Nevertheless, the classification must
rationally advance "a reasonable and identifiable governmental
objective." 357
No matter what type of equal protection argument is
presented by a criminal defendant or civil plaintiff in an at-
tempt to invalidate the Lautenberg Amendment, it would be
folly to say that there is no rational relationship between the
law and the governmental interest. As articulated by the Sena-
tor Lautenberg upon enactment of the statute, the intention of
the law is to protect victims of domestic violence and keep fire-
arms out of the hands of offenders who have demonstrated a
propensity towards the use of physical force against their family
350. See Jonathan Kerr, Critics Say Anti-Domestic Violence Amendment
Takes Shot At Police, WESi'S LEGAL NEWS, Dec. 2, 1996, available in 1996 WL
684742, at 1. The Fraternal Order of Police represents more than 270,000 mem-
bers nationwide. See Barr and Fraternal Order of Police Slam Lautenberg Gun
Ban, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Sept. 30, 1997, available in WL, U.S. NEWSWIRE database.
351. See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
352. See id.
353. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993).
354. See id. at 319-20.
355. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 15 (1992).
356. See id.
357. Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 235 (1981).
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members or other loved ones. 358 Clearly protecting victims and
removing firearms from people who made these victims into vic-
tims is a legitimate governmental interest. To that end, creat-
ing the class of misdemeanor domestic violence offenders is not
irrational.
Arguably, one contesting the law could inquire as to why
the law does not place the ban on any misdemeanant whose
predicate offense involves as an element the use or attempted
use of physical force. The quick answer is that Congress has
the power to implement laws incrementally; that is, first it can
start with misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence and then, if
it so desires, add different classes of misdemeanants to the ban
until ultimately all misdemeanors involving the use of force are
effectively banned from possessing a firearm. There is nothing
improper in so legislating.359 As the court in Barrett stated:
The court need not.., engage in a debate as to whether Congress
should have cast its net wider when it enacted § 922(g)(9) because
equal protection principles are not violated when legislative re-
form "take[s] one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of
the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind."360
The intent of Congress was to curb the ever growing prob-
lem of domestic violence, which as noted from the statistics
above,361 is a colossal problem both for the victims who live in
constant fear and danger, and for the country which ultimately
spends billions of dollars in medical, criminal justice and lost
productivity to industry costs. Curbing this colossal problem is
certainly a governmental interest. As statistics indicate, fire-
arms are used in 65% of fatal domestic violence disputes.362
Thus, Congress' removal of firearms from people with misde-
meanor domestic violence convictions is certainly rationally re-
lated. Pursuant to the state of the law, Congress' decision to act
is constitutional. 363
358. See generally 142 CONG. REC. $11,872-01 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (state-
ment of Sen. Lautenberg).
359. See National Ass'n of Gov't Employees, Inc. v. Barrett, 968 F. Supp. 1564,
1573 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
360. Id. (quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483,
489 (1955)).
361. See supra notes 302-08 and accompanying text.
362. See infra note 419 and accompanying text.
363. See supra Part II(C).
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When a classification is rationally based, any uneven effect
upon particular group within a class is ordinarily of no constitu-
tional consequence. 364  A classification may affect certain
classes within the classification unevenly though the law treats
them no differently from other members of class,3 65 unless it can
be demonstrated by the challenger that Congress had a discrim-
inatory intent when it drafted the classification. 366
In Barrett, the challengers were law enforcement officers
who had lost or faced the possibility of losing their jobs.3 67 Law
enforcement officers are a class of misdemeanants within the
general classification. While the impact may be disproportion-
ate, the law enforcement officers are ultimately treated the
same as any other person with a misdemeanor crime of domes-
tic violence, which is completely within the bounds of the
Constitution.
There is no higher standard being imposed against those
law enforcement officers with a misdemeanor conviction of do-
mestic violence. Rather, those officers are being treated like
every other member of the classification as indeed they should
be. If a person has a propensity towards behavior that includes
the use of physical force against his family or other loved ones,
how much more dangerous is he if he is permitted to carry a
firearm on a daily basis? How much more elevated are the
chances that something horrible will happen in his home that
involves the use of that gun? A person should not be excluded
from the effect of the law because he is a law enforcement of-
ficer. "If you hit your wife [husband, child or other loved one]
you lose your gun. Guns make any domestic situation more
dangerous."368
While a law enforcement officer faces the prospect of losing
his job, he is nevertheless being treated equally under the law.
The effect is, unfortunately for the affected law enforcement of-
364. See Personnel Adm'r of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 271-74
(1979).
365. See id.; see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1976) (hold-
ing that a law can render a disproportionate effect on a class and yet be constitu-
tional under the Equal Protection Clause).
366. See National Ass'n of Gov't Employees, Inc. v. Barrett, 968 F. Supp. 1564,
1575 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (citing Feeney, 442 U.S. at 272-74).
367. See id. at 1568-69.
368. See Kerr, supra note 350.
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ficer, perhaps disproportionate, yet the goal Congress is seeking
to achieve warrants such a result. 369 There are other classes
within the classification of people convicted of misdemeanor
crimes of domestic violence who will lose their jobs. This result,
however, is not unconstitutional.
Nevertheless, the D.C. Circuit, in its initial reversal of the
district court in Fraternal Order of Police v. United States,
found the Lautenberg Amendment violative of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause to the extent that law enforcement officers,
through 18 U.S.C. § 925(a)(1), are not exempt from the mandate
of, inter alia, § 922(g)(9).370
There is no fundamental right to public employment, 371
thus no fundamental right is being infringed by the 1996
amendments.37 2 Additionally, the class affected by this statute,
specifically, law enforcement officers with a misdemeanor con-
viction of domestic violence, is not suspect.37 3 The 1996 amend-
ments that "burden" this class, therefore, should be reviewed
under a rational basis standard and not strict scrutiny.37 4
The D.C. Circuit initially found, however, that the "1996
amendments fall into the narrow class of provisions that fail
even the most permissive, "rational basis" review."375 The court
apparently believed that the 1996 amendments were underin-
clusive as individuals convicted of misdemeanor crimes of do-
mestic violence were treated more harshly by Congress than
those convicted of domestic violence felonies. Even taking the
court's findings at face value, the D.C. Circuit court has held in
the past, following the United States Supreme Court's lead,
that "underinclusiveness analysis is simply to 'ensure that the
proffered state interest actually underlies the law.'"376 "[A] rule
is struck for underinclusiveness only if it cannot 'fairly be said
369. See supra Part II(A).
370. See Fraternal Order of Police v. United States, 152 F.3d 998 (D.C. Cir.
1998).
371. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313
(1976).
372. See supra notes 345-50 and accompanying text.
373. See supra notes 345-51 and accompanying text.
374. See Murgia, 427 U.S. at 312.
375. Fraternal Order of Police, 152 F.3d at 1002 (citations omitted).
376. Blount v. Securities and Exchange Comm'n, 61 F.3d 938, 946 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (quoting Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 677 (1990)
(Brennan, J., concurring)).
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to advance any genuinely substantial governmental inter-
est."' 377 Here, as demonstrated above, there is clearly a legiti-
mate state interest - curbing domestic violence and its social
and economic effects on American society.
To say that the 1996 amendments are not rationally related
to a state interest is clearly erroneous - as the D.C. Circuit ulti-
mately held.3 78 Further, even if it is accepted as true that the
misdemeanor domestic violence misdemeanants are treated
more harshly than convicted felons pursuant to the 1996
amendments, the D.C. Circuit itself has held in the past that
"equal protection of the laws does not require Congress in every
instance to order evils hierarchically according to their magni-
tude and to legislate against the greater before the lesser."379
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has noted that if a
classification has "some 'reasonable basis,' it does not offend the
Constitution simply because [it] 'is not made with mathematical
nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality. '"' 380
Moreover, "the problems of government are practical ones and
may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations - il-
logical, it may be, and unscientific." 38 ' Finally, the Supreme
Court noted that a "statutory discrimination will not be set
aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify
it."382 Affording added protection to a person whose spouse has
a prior misdemeanor conviction of domestic violence and yet is
allowed to possess a firearm on a daily basis is certainly a suffi-
ciently reasonable justification for enacting the laws.
Congress has indeed insured that convicted felons are pre-
cluded from possessing firearms. 38 3 The D.C. Circuit, though
holding that sections 922(g)(9) and 925(a)(1) as applied to law
enforcement officers are indeed constitutional, still is not com-
377. Id. (quoting F.C.C. v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 396
(1984)).
378. See Fraternal Order of Police v. United States, No. 97cv00145, 1999 WL
218442 (D.C.Cir. April 16, 1999).
379. United States v. Holland, 810 F.2d 1215, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
380. Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 600-01 (1987) (quoting Lindsley v. Natu-
ral Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911)).
381. Id. at 601 (quoting Metropolis Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U.S.
61, 69-70 (1913)).
382. Id. (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961)) (emphasis
added).
383. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
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fortable with the fact that law enforcement officers are, accord-
ing to § 925(a)(1), exempt from the felon in possession provision
but not the misdemeanor domestic violence convict in posses-
sion provision.384 Nevertheless, the D.C. Circuit recognized
that there may be "nonlegal restrictions" that prevent a firearm
from being issued to a felon. 38 5 In fact, it is likely a well-known
fact amongst the congressmen who overwhelmingly approved
the enactment of the 1996 amendments that a law enforcement
officer who is convicted of any felony, not just one of domestic
violence, is discharged from his position, which of course means
that he loses his firearm.38 6 Such a result is what the 1996
amendments ultimately were enacted to achieve. According to
the United States Department of Justice, Office of Public Af-
fairs, if a federal law enforcement officer is charged and con-
victed of any felony, he loses his job.38 7 If, after he serves time
in prison, is released, reapplies for another federal position that
requires him to carry a firearm and his prior felony conviction is
discovered, he is automatically discharged.388  The Deputy
Commission of Public Information for the New York City Police
Department similarly stated that if an officer is convicted of any
felony, he is automatically discharged. 38 9 The Media Relations
Office for the Los Angeles Police Department expressed that
they had the same policy.390
In many cases where a person is convicted of a misde-
meanor crime of domestic violence, such conviction is a result of
a plea bargain for what would otherwise have been a felony con-
viction.391 If a law enforcement officer is the beneficiary of such
a plea bargain, the new amendments act to cure that former
loophole in the law. The amendments do not stack the deck
against those individuals convicted of a misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence as the D.C. Circuit initially found. Rather,
384. See Fraternal Order of Police, 1999 WL 218442 at *4.
385. Id.
386. See Reich, supra note 44, at B-1.
387. Telephonic statement from the United States Department of Justice, Of-
fice of Public Affairs (Feb. 24, 1999).
388. Id.
389. Telephonic statement from the Deputy Commissioner of Public Affairs
for the New York City Police Department (Feb. 24, 1999).
390. Telephonic statement from the Media Relations Office of the Los Angeles
Police Department, (Feb. 24, 1999).
391. See infra note 396 and accompanying text.
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the amendments operate to close the substantial loophole and
clearly do "fill a practical gap."392
For the reasons mentioned above, it is evident that the law
passes Equal Protection muster, and that the decision of the
D.C. Circuit ultimately holding the amendments constitutional
as applied to law enforcement officers was proper.
E. The Lautenberg Amendment is Good Policy
The story of Barbara O'Dell is far from over. Ultimately,
Rodolfo was able to have his record expunged and thus continue
to work as a detective for the Los Angeles Sheriffs Depart-
ment.3 93 Unfortunately, there are still some loopholes that al-
low misdemeanants convicted of crimes of domestic violence
and even ex-felons to again possess firearms. 394 However, the
Lautenberg Amendment is one more in just a few existing steps
taken by Congress to assist in combating the horrors of domes-
tic violence. While the law did not ultimately help Barbara
O'Dell, perhaps it helped someone like her.
In evaluating the benefit of the Lautenberg Amendment,
perhaps the fundamental question is or certainly should be: Do
we want a person such as Rodolfo O'Dell, who has a misde-
meanor conviction for domestic violence, that should really be a
felony, to be among our law enforcement officers? Do we want
such a person to have daily access to a firearm? Clearly any
reasonable person would answer those questions in the nega-
tive. Most assuredly, Barbara O'Dell does not. Because of the
Lautenberg Amendment, people such as Rodolfo O'Dell, whose
continued employment as a law enforcement officer offends sen-
sibility, will in some way be affected, if not completely dis-
armed, by its enactment. Such a result likely will save the lives
of many domestic violence victims.
Clearly, there is a long way to go in helping victims of do-
mestic violence. Opponents to the Lautenberg Amendment, in-
deed, even Senator Lautenberg himself, acknowledged the
problem of domestic violence crimes that should have been
392. Fraternal Order of Police v. United States, 152 F.3d 998, 1003 (D.C. Cir.
1998).
393. See Tobar, supra note 1, at B-1.
394. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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charged as felonies but are pleaded down to misdemeanors. 395
The Smith court noted that
[u]nder current Federal law, it is illegal for persons convicted of
felonies to possess firearms, yet, many people who engage in seri-
ous spousal or child abuse ultimately are not charged with or con-
victed of felonies. At the end of the day, due to outdated laws or
thinking, perhaps after a plea bargain, they are, at most, con-
victed of a misdemeanor. In fact, most of those who commit fam-
ily violence are never even prosecuted. But when they are, one-
third of the cases that would be considered felonies, if committed
by strangers, are instead filed as misdemeanors. 396
Why should a stranger face a more severe penalty than a family
member or intimate partner? It seems that the reverse should
be true, for it is the offending family member or intimate part-
ner that knows all too well the effect of his actions on his victim.
If the crime should have been a felony, yet was reduced to a
misdemeanor for whatever reason, the logic of the Lautenberg
Amendment is all the more evident.397 If the offender, ulti-
mately convicted of a misdemeanor, should have been convicted
of a felony in the first place, he should not be able to legally
possess or receive a firearm.398 The Lautenberg Amendment
acts to close a loophole in the law that essentially allowed a
felon who "got lucky" and had his offense reduced to a misde-
meanor, to possess a firearm when he was at the time perhaps
even more of a danger to his victim than he was before. 399
Moreover, in law enforcement agencies across the country,
a law enforcement officer convicted of a felony loses his job as an
officer.400 An officer with a misdemeanor conviction of domestic
violence, especially if it was a felony charge pleaded down to a
misdemeanor, should not only be unable to carry a firearm or
ammunition, but should not be a law enforcement officer. Pe-
riod. It does not matter how long ago the predicate offense oc-
curred. The Lautenberg Amendment works to close this
loophole that police officers were previously able to use in ac-
395. See 142 Cong. Rec. S11,872-01 (daily ed. Sept. 30 1996) (statement of
Sen. Lautenberg).
396. United States v. Smith, 964 F. Supp. 286, 292 (N.D. Iowa 1997).
397. See supra Part III(D).
398. See supra Part I.
399. See supra note 396 and accompanying text.
400. See Reich, supra note 44, at B-1.
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quiring and maintaining employment that required them to
possess a firearm. 401
Opponents say that this statute works against victims,
placing them in a more difficult position. 402 Turning back again
to Barbara O'Dell's story, she attempted to contact law enforce-
ment prior to the July 1992 incident to complain about her hus-
band's abusive behavior. 40 3 The officers to which she had to
report were not only her husband's fellow employees, but his
friends. 40 4 Barbara was told by one of Rodolfo's supervisors at
the time of his arrest for the July 1992 incident that her case
would have been handled better had she been "just an average
citizen."40 5 Moreover, because she was the wife of a deputy
sheriff, she was told that "they moved slower."40 6
The Lautenberg Amendment removes from the victim the
responsibility of turning in her husband or intimate partner to
his law enforcement co-employees and friends. 407 For the victim
of a law enforcement officer, the choice of further angering her
spouse is no longer present. The responsibility lies with the
abuser. If he has a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence
conviction and does not refrain from working in a position for
which he must carry a firearm, he opens himself up to criminal
sanctions. 408 As discussed above, the majority of law enforce-
ment agencies are cooperating by implementing some sort of
program to find affected officers and remove their firearms from
them.40 9 Thus, the statute operates in favor of domestic vio-
lence victims whose abusers are law enforcement officers and
places the burden on offenders.410
Contrary to the claims of the Lautenberg Amendment's op-
ponents, 41' the removal of firearms from those convicted of a
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence will save lives. 412 Rep-
401. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
402. See supra Part 11(D).
403. See Tobar, supra note 1, at B-1.
404. See id.
405. Id.
406. Id.
407. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
408. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
409. See supra Part II(B).
410. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
411. See supra Part IH(D).
412. See infra notes 416-19 and accompanying text.
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resentative Chenoweth noted in her letter to the Chairman of
the House Committee on the Judiciary and the Chairman of the
House Committee Subcommittee on Crime that "a recent study
by the Utah Department of Public Safety [found that] firearms
were only used in three percent of all domestic violence cases...
[and that] personal weapons, i.e. hands, feet, and teeth, were
used in eighty-six percent of domestic violence cases."413 They
used these very isolated statistics to declare the Lautenberg
Amendment a failure at meeting its goal of protecting battered
spouses and abused children by banning firearms when they
are "used in a minute number of instances."414 Respectfully,
Representative Chenoweth's statistics are not representative of
the problem posed by domestic violence as related to
firearms .415
In Iowa, where the Smith case was prosecuted, Stephen
Rapp, the United States Attorney for the Northern District of
Iowa stated in the press release announcing Smith's sentence
that since approximately 1991, ninety-one people in the state of
Iowa, nine of which were children, were murdered in a domestic
violence incident.416 In fifty-three of those cases, firearms were
used.417 Of those cases, many of the defendants had previously
been convicted of crimes of domestic violence. 418
Moreover, in a press release, Senator Lautenberg stated
that according to FBI data, nearly 3,500 women and children
would die in 1996 as a result of domestic violence "at the hands
of men who once claimed to love them. Sixty-five percent of
those women [would] be killed by firearms."41 9 While it is un-
413. Letter from Representative Helen Chenoweth, United States House of
Representatives, et al., to Henry J. Hyde, Chairman of the House Committee on
the Judiciary, and Bill McCollum, Chairman of the House Committee on the Judi-
ciary, Subcommittee on Crime (Oct. 9, 1997) (on file with the Office of U.S. Rep.
Helen Chenoweth) (emphasis theirs).
414. Id.
415. See infra notes 416-19 and accompanying text.
416. See Press Release from Stephen Rapp, Cedar Falls Man Sentenced is
First in the Nation Conviction Under New Federal Law, at 2 (Nov. 21, 1997) (on file
with U.S. Dep't of Justice).
417. See id.
418. See id.
419. Frank Lautenberg, Lautenberg Offers Amendment to Treasury, Postal
Service Appropriations Bill That Takes Guns Out of the Hands of Wife Beaters and
Child Abusers, GOV'T PRESS RELEASES, Sept. 12, 1996 (emphasis added), available
in 1996 WL 11124929.
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known what percentage, if any, of these offenders were police
officers, the statistics are nevertheless relevant to demonstrate
the problem. If there is a person who has previously been con-
victed of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, he or she
should not be permitted to possess a firearm. Had those offend-
ers been prohibited from possessing a firearm, many victims
might either still be alive today or been spared the ordeal of
suffering a potentially fatal bullet wound.
VI. Conclusion
Clearly, the Lautenberg Amendment alone "will not pre-
vent or end the problems of domestic violence in this coun-
try."420 There is no doubt that opponents to the law are correct
in such a statement. Rodolfo O'Dell ultimately had his record
expunged and as of May 1997, when his wife's story was pub-
lished, was working as a detective in the Los Angeles Sheriffs
Department. 421 While this is certainly not the result anyone
wants to see, the whole O'Dell story is demonstrative of the
need to combat domestic violence, even if it is only one small
step at a time. The Lautenberg Amendment is one more step in
that long path towards a very important goal of protecting vic-
tims of domestic violence.
The Amendment is not a usurpation of Congress' power
under the Commerce Clause, it does not force states to enforce a
federal regulation in violation of the Tenth Amendment, it is
not an ex post facto law, and it is not violative of equal protec-
tion under the laws pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. Rather, it is, like its sister statute
§ 922(g)(1), a constitutional enactment aimed at protecting in-
nocent lives from a potentially fatal situation.
While the statute may appear especially harsh to law en-
forcement officers who are forced to surrender their firearms
and consequently lose their jobs if they have misdemeanor con-
victions of domestic violence, such a result should be applauded
not only by the public, but by law enforcement agencies them-
selves. Law enforcement officers deserve the utmost respect for
420. FOP Supports Amendment of 'Domestic Violence Gun Ban' Law, U.S.
NEWSWIRE, Mar. 5, 1997, at 1.
421. See Tobar, supra note 1, at B-1.
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the way they literally dedicate their lives to protecting the pub-
lic. The Lautenberg Amendment seeks to remove those officers
that live a hypocritical life. A law enforcement officer, sworn to
serve and protect the public, has no right to work in such a ca-
pacity if, rather than protecting his own family or loved ones, he
is abusing them in their own home. The Lautenberg Amend-
ment should stand.
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